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1 - Introduction    1 
1 Introduction 
The present research is concerned with factors determining the extent of harm that is 
inflicted on members of deviant groups. One essential characteristic of a group is the pursuit 
of a common group goal. However, those who refrain from the pursuit of this group goal are 
likely to be perceived as deviants by their fellow group members. It is argued that the 
representation of a group goal either as an ideal, that should be aspired, or as a threshold, that 
has to be unconditionally reached, is a crucial determinant of the extent of harm that is 
inflicted on members of a deviant group. Two examples might illustrate this concern. 
Example 1: 
In a strike workers are united by the common goal of fighting for better working 
conditions and higher wages for all workers. But there are individual rationales not to join in a 
strike. Some workers may shy away from an open confrontation with their employer and 
continue to work. But those workers who do not join the strike will be considered strike-
breakers by their fellow workers. Strike-breakers are often the target of verbal abuse, social 
exclusion, beatings and even premeditated murder because of their deviation from the 
common group goal of striking. Sometimes even uninvolved third parties such as the families 
of strike-breakers are threatened. But why is that in some cases simple name-calling is 
perceived to be the adequate reaction towards the deviant group of strike-breakers and 
sometimes cold-blooded murder? 
Example 2: 
It is one of the most fundamental group endeavors to protect one´s country against an 
enemy. However, many religious groups such as Franciscans, Mennonites, Quakers or 
Jehova´s Witnesses have been refusing to fight in armed conflicts because of their religious 
beliefs. Many kinds of harm have been inflicted on these religious groups in response. These 
forms of harm have been ranging from simple fees, to significantly prolonged alternative 
social service, social exclusion in the form of imprisonment, to extreme forms of punishment 
such as summary executions. But what determines if a group that is refusing to fight in a war 
is simply fined or killed for this deviation from a common group goal? 
These two examples share a number of basic similarities. Both examples are based on an 
important group goal that requires the collective effort of its group members. This group 
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endeavor can be a strike or the defense of one´s country. But in both examples a number of 
group members deviate from this group goal. These deviants may constitute a group in 
advance as the religious groups in the second example or may be defined as a group by their 
coherent behavior of deviating from the group goal as the non-striking workers in the first 
example. The conceivable negative reactions toward members of those deviant groups range 
in both examples from relatively mild forms of punishment such as name calling to severe 
forms of harm such as physical violence and murder. It is suggested that the way the common 
group goal is represented has a crucial impact on the infliction of harm on those deviants. 
The group goal of striking might be represented as an ideal, a maximal goal. This goal 
should be aspired as much as possible. The negative reactions towards a group of workers 
deviating from this group goal of striking by continuing their work are expected to be graded 
in this case: The more a group of workers deviates from the group goal of striking, the more 
harm is inflicted on them. But the group goal of striking could also be represented as a 
dichotomous minimal goal. A minimal goal is either fully achieved or not at all. It constitutes 
a normative border that must not be crossed. Picket lines might be interpreted as a behavioral 
manifestation of such a dichotomous, minimal goal representation of the group goal of 
striking. Any group deviating from the group goal of striking instead of working - crossing 
the picket line - will be confronted with the infliction of severe harm. The degree of their 
transgression - how far or how long the picket line is crossed - does not affect the extent of 
harm that is inflicted on them. The extent of harm will be severe, no matter how far or for 
how long they cross the picket line. 
The same logic can be applied to the example of the common group goal of fighting for 
ones country. This group goal might be represented as an ideal maximal goal. The degree of 
harm that is inflicted on a group of deviants is relative, depending on the degree of their 
perceived deviation from this goal. The greater their perceived deviation from the group goal 
of fighting for one´s country, the more severe the extent of harm, that is inflicted on this group 
of deviants. However, the group goal of fighting for one´s country may also be represented as 
a minimal group goal, a goal that just has to be achieved - for example during times of war. In 
this case any deviation from this minimal group goal at all will be perceived as a severe 
transgression and will result in the infliction of severe forms of harm such as collective 
executions. 
The same deviation from the very same group goal may lead to the infliction of different 
degrees of harm on a group of deviants, depending on the representation of the group goal as 
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either a minimal or a maximal goal. A group deviating from a group goal, that is represented 
as a maximal goal is expected to be punished relative to the degree of their perceived 
deviation. However, any deviation from a minimal group goal is perceived as a severe 
transgression - because of its dichotomous structure. Therefore, the very same group would be 
punished severely for any deviation from the group goal - regardless of the degree of their 
deviation - if this group goal was represented as a minimal goal. It is therefore the aim of the 
current research to scrutinize this expected impact of the representation of a group goal as 





2.1 Deviant Groups 
Both initial examples describe the infliction of harm on members of a deviant group. But 
what is the difference between a group that is perceived as merely different and a group that is 
perceived as deviant? First it has to be pointed out that the perception of deviance is not 
rooted in the deviants themselves or their behavior per se: "...social groups create deviance by 
making rules whose infraction creates deviance, and by applying those roles to particular 
people […] deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence 
of the application by other of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.'” (Becker, 1963). However, 
the question remains how a group defines which rules are perceived as binding for all of its 
members and what therefore determines when a group of individuals is perceived to merely 
differ or to deviate from these rules. 
The Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) constitutes an attempt to 
explain the evaluation of Outgroups (OG) on the basis of Social Comparison Theory (e.g. 
Festinger, 1954) and Self Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987). The model assumes that groups are compared with reference to an inclusive 
superordinate group (SOG) and that members of an Ingroup (IG) tend to generalize IG-
attributes to the prototype of this SOG (Ingroup-projection). The prototype of the SOG 
defines how a member of the SOG ought to be. Consequently the IG is perceived as more 
prototypical than the OG (higher perceived relative IG-prototypicality). Therefore, a greater 
perceived relative deviation of the OG from the prototype of the SOG compared to the IG 
justifies therefore negative attitudes toward the OG (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & 
Weber, 2003). An application of the Ingroup Projection Model to one of the initial examples 
may illustrate its implications. Workers in general constitute a common SOG for both striking 
(IG) and non-striking workers (OG). Striking workers project their IG-goal of striking for 
better wages to the SOG of all workers. The OG-behavior of not striking is evaluated with 
reference to this representation of the SOG goal of striking. The deviance of the non-striking 
workers (OG) is evaluated in relation to the IG-goal of striking that is projected on the SOG. 
The OG’s perceived deviance from this SOG-goal justifies a negative evaluation of the OG 
and even negative behavior towards its members. 
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The current research is concerned with determinants of the extent of harm that is inflicted 
on deviant groups. Why are workers who decide not to join a strike effort sometimes merely 
frowned upon by their fellow workers and at other times threatened with physical violence 
and even murder? The following chapter addresses how the very same act of deviation may 
lead to different levels of harm inflicted on a group of deviants. 
2.2 Minimal and Maximal Goals 
According to Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson (2002), people tend to punish relative to the 
degree of deviance and to the perceived maliciousness of intention of a deviating individual or 
group. They showed in several studies that the factors degree of deviance and non-normative 
intent determine the degree of punishment. Other factors related to utilitarian ideologies - 
such as a deterrence motive - have only a smaller effect on the extent of assigned punishment 
(see also Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000). But why do people perceive some deviations 
of an OG as only relatively negative while other people perceive the same deviations as 
absolutely negative? Mummendey and co-authors proposed two basic types of goals that 
differ fundamentally with respect to the evaluation of an event relative to that goal: Minimal 
and maximal goals (Mummendey, Waldzus and Kessler, 2002; see also: Kessler, Neumann, 
Mummendey, Berthold & Waldzus, 2010). Maximal goals are desired or undesired end states 
that can be approached or avoided. Events which are evaluated relative to maximal goals are 
judged by their relative distance from these goals and therefore receive a graded evaluation. 
The valence of an event relative to a maximal goal depends on its distance to the goal. In 
contrast to this “shades of grey” type of evaluation, minimal goals lead to “black/ white” 
evaluations of an event. Minimal goals define a certain point that must be exceeded. A 
minimal goal can therefore only be fully met or not met at all. An event which is evaluated 
relative to a minimal goal receives a dichotomous evaluation and is therefore either entirely 
positive or negative. It is assumed that the representation of a superordinate goal1 as either 
minimal or maximal not only affects the evaluation of an event relative to this goal, but also 
has strong implications on the behavioral reactions towards members of an OG that is 
deviating from this goal. The deviation from a minimal goal should lead to more negative 
reactions compared to the deviation from a graded maximal goal, because any deviation is 
evaluated as completely negative regardless of the absolute degree of deviation. Several 
                                                 





studies by Kessler, Neumann, Mummendey, Berthold, Schubert, and Waldzus (2010) and 
Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey, and Neumann (2009) support the distinction between 
minimal and maximal goals and provide evidence for their specific effects on the evaluation 
of deviants. Kessler et al. (2010) showed that the degree of deviance and the type of standard - 
minimal versus maximal - interact with regard to the level of assigned punishment behavior. 
The degree of deviance did not affect the severity of the assigned punishment for participants 
oriented towards a minimal standard. In contrast for participants oriented towards a maximal 
standard the degree of deviance was crucial for the level of assigned punishment. Fritsche et 
al. (2009) assessed quasi-experimentally how individual chronic differences in the tendency 
to set minimal versus maximal goals increase punishment inclinations and social exclusion 
tendencies. Berthold, Mummendey, Kessler, and Lücke (submitted) showed further that the 
fundamental differentiation between minimal and maximal goals applies as well to intergroup 
relations. They could show in the framework of the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey 
& Wenzel, 1999) that minimal goals are of specific importance for ingroup projection and 
therefore affect attitudes towards OGs deviating from superordinate goals. It is the aim of the 
present research to extend these findings in an experimental setting by showing the impact of 
minimal and maximal representations of a superordinate group goal on the infliction of harm 
on members of an OG deviating from this superordinate goal. The following chapter sets out 





2.3 The Infliction of Harm on Deviants 
2.3.1 Social Discrimination 
An extensive body of research dealing with social discrimination has done so focussing on 
stereotypes of and prejudices towards OGs. However, the present research is explicitly 
concerned with the negative behavioral manifestations of social discrimination. It is focusing 
on the phenomenon of blatant negative discrimination within the broader category of social 
discrimination: The intentional infliction of harm on members of a deviant OG (e.g. Bar-Tal, 
1989; Bar-Tal, 1990, Bar-Tal, 2004, Staub, 1989, 1999). The central research question is 
concerned with the extent of harm that is inflicted on group members deviating from a 
common goal. What is it that determines if these deviants are punished weakly or severely? 
Why are strike-breakers sometimes merely frowned upon by their fellow workers and at other 
times murdered? 
More than 50 years ago Sherif developed his theory of realistic group conflict (Sherif, 
White, & Harvey, 1955; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, Sherif, 1961). The theory was based on 
the results of the summer camp experiments dealing with group formation, the development 
of intergroup conflict and the possibility to resolve this conflict. The Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory states that attitudes as well as behavior toward members of IG and OG are 
consequences of the functional relation between the goals of IG and OG. An intergroup 
relation characterized by conflicting group goals - negative interdependence - leads according 
to the Realistic Group Conflict Theory to a perception of competition with the OG, prejudice 
and derogative behavior toward the OG and at the same time to a positive evaluation of one´s 
IG. Subsequent research could show that a negative interdependence of IG and OG goals was 
not an essential precondition to elicit discriminatory tendencies. A common fate of members 
of a group is an important factor in the equation leading to IG favoritism and OG derogation 
(Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982). This function was further specified by 
Tajfel and co-authors and the development of the Minimal Group Paradigm. The initial 
motivation for the development of the Minimal Group Paradigm was the definition of a 
baseline condition for no discrimination to occur (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). 
First results showed that the mere categorization in salient but trivial groups was sufficient to 
elicit IG favouritism. It was specifically observed that group members were using a strategy to 
maximize the relative differences between their IG and an OG even at the cost of sacrificing 
the maximum profit for their IG (maximizing difference strategy). A rich body of subsequent 
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research confirmed this initial finding on a multitude of different measures (e.g. Brown, 2000; 
Messick & Mackie, 1989). Social discrimination in the form of IG favouritism can occur as a 
result of a mere group categorization. Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory 
developed as theoretical foundations for these results that emphasise a comparative 
perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). 
This approach builds on peoples´ motivation to sustain a positive identity. In a situation in 
which people define themselves on the basis of a salient social identity, a positive evaluation 
can be established by a comparison outcome between their IG and a relevant OG that creates 
positive distinctiveness for ones IG in relation to the OG. In both Social Identity Theory and 
Self-Categorization Theory discrimination against an OG is seen as an individual´s attempt to 
achieve positive distinctiveness via its IG identity in a salient intergroup context 
(Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Maximizing the distance between IG and OG on a relevant 
dimension of comparison should - according to this comparative perspective on 
discrimination - not be restricted to a positive domain but also hold true in a negative domain 
(see Table 1). Empirical evidence however showed that IG favoritism and discrimination of 
the OG in a positively valued domain are not necessarily related to explicitly negative 
intentions to inflict harm on the OG. Struch and Schwarz presented a study focussing on 
intergroup aggression toward an OG of ultraorthodox Jews (Struch & Schwarz, 1989). The 
measures of intergroup aggression included the opposition to institutions serving the needs of 
the OG, the support of harmful acts toward the OG and the opposition to interactions with the 
OG. The perceived conflict of interests between IG and OG was highly related to aggressive 
intentions toward the OG. Participants showed also OG-favoritism in trait evaluations, but it 
was unrelated to any aggressive intentions toward the OG. 
A multitude of experimental studies document systematic differences between the 
assignment of positive and negative resources to one´s IG and an OG. It could be shown that 
participants who had to assign an aversive resource - varying durations of an unpleasant 
sound - to IG and OG members did not show IG favoritism or follow a maximizing difference 
strategy. Instead fairness was the dominant strategy for the assignment of this negative 
resource to members of the arbitrarily assigned IG and OG (Mummendey, Simon, Dietze, 
Grünert, Haeger, Kessler, Lettgen, & Schäferhoff, 1992). Mere identification as established in 
the Minimal Group Paradigm alone appears to be insufficient for explicit negative OG 
derogation to occur (Mummendey & Otten 1998). The general effect that IG favoritism is less 
likely to occur in the domain of negative resource allocation than it is in the domain of 
positive resource allocation has been coined the Positive Negative Asymmetry of Social 
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Discrimination. The central finding of the Positive Negative Asymmetry was supported by a 
meta-analysis sampling 52 studies investigating in-group bias using an experimental 
manipulation of valence of the experimental condition (Buhl, 1999). Participants 
discriminated in these studies significantly less on negative scales than on positive scales. The 
effect sizes from the positive and negative valence conditions were not significantly 
correlated suggesting that different processes underlie intergroup discrimination in a positive 
respectively a negative domain. 
 
Table 1: A Taxonomy of Social Discrimination (from: Mummendey & Simon, 1991; 
Mummendey & Otten, 1998) 
 Valence 
Behavior Positive stimuli Negative stimuli 
Allocation Direct discrimination IG > OG (a) Direct discrimination 
IG < 
OG (b) 





Attempts to explain the Positive Negative Asymmetry included valence specific differences in 
information processing (Mummendey & Otten, 1998) and the effect of stimulus-valence on 
the inclusiveness of self-categorization (Mummendey, Otten, Berger & Kessler, 2000). It 
could be shown in a motivational approach to the Positive Negative Asymmetry that the 
allocation of positive and negative resources depends on the match of regulatory focus and the 
valence of the distributed resources (Sassenberg, Kessler, & Mummendey, 2003). Social 
discrimination was higher when social identity was salient and a regulatory fit between group 
based regulatory focus and valence of distributed resources was given. It could be shown that 
a simple framing lead to a reversal of the Positive Negative Asymmetry for participants with a 
momentary prevention focus. Social discrimination occurred under a promotion focus when a 
positive resource was allocated and under a prevention focus when a negative resource was 
allocated. No such effect was found for the distribution of negative resources under a 
promotion focus or for the distribution of positive resources under a prevention focus. 
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The present research is in contrast to the research on the Positive-Negative Asymmetry of 
Social Discrimination not concerned with minimal conditions for discrimination based on 
negative resources to occur. This line of research is instead focusing on the degrees of harm 
inflicted on members of a deviant OG (Struch & Schwarz, 1989, Levin & Sidanius, 1999). 
But what are then “aggravating” conditions leading to explicit negative discrimination of 
members of an OG (s. Table 1)? Brewer (Brewer, 1999; 2001) criticized the idea of a direct 
mutual conditionality of IG favoritism and explicit negative OG derogation as initially stated 
by Sumner: “Loyalty of the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, 
brotherhood within, warlikeness without - all grow together, common products of the same 
situation” (Sumner, 1906). Instead Brewer suggested a conceptual separation of favoritism of 
one´s own group over another, “Ingroup Love”, on the one side and “Outgroup Hate”, the 
explicit derogation of an OG, on the other (Brewer, 1979; Brewer, 2001). Brewer argues that 
OG hostility is based on social categorization and identification with a group but that these 
factors are not sufficient and that this relation is by no means causal. She proposes rather that 
OGs might become relevant in relation to IG based motives such as the need for secure 
inclusion, the protection of IG distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991) and a positive evaluation of 
one´s IG in relation to other groups. The competition for social status and the perception of an 
OG as a potential threat with regard to one of these motives serves as a breeding ground for 
hostilities toward an OG. This line of argument coincides with research conducted on the 
Positive Negative Asymmetry of Social Discrimination. Mummendey and co-authors proposed 
an Aggravation Hypothesis on the basis of the Positive Negative Asymmetry of Social 
Discrimination. Social discrimination in a negative domain requires according to this 
hypothesis not only a salient social categorization but additional factors that exacerbate the 
pursuit of a positive group-based distinctiveness. Research by Blanz, Mummendey, and Otten 
showed that social discrimination in the negative domain occurred only when two aggravating 
conditions co-occurred, namely a high salience of size- and status- similarity between IG and 
OG and a high level of IG identification (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995a, 1995b). It was 
argued that only individuals who are motivated to strive for a positive social identity - because 
of their threatened or negative social identity - assign more negative resources to an OG than 
to their own IG (Mummendey & Otten, 1998). 
Another line of research has identified various forms of intergroup threat as important 
factors leading to negative OG attitudes (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner. 2006; Stephan & Stephan 
1996). Sherif´s aforementioned Realistic Group Conflict Theory constituted an important 
starting point for this research. Conflicting group goals lead according to the Realistic Group 
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Conflict Theory to higher levels of perceived intergroup competition and more negative 
attitudes toward the OG (e.g. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Jackson, & 
Armstrong, 1998). This is even the case if individual group members are not directly affected 
by the outcome of the intergroup conflict (Bobo, 1983). This approach has been 
complemented by alternative approaches to intergroup threat. Symbolic threats such as 
conflicting values of groups may lead even in the absence of any realistic intergroup conflict 
to an increase in negative attitudes toward members of an OG (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 
1993; Kinder & Sears, 1981, Sears 1988). More recently Stephan and Stephan proposed their 
Intergrated Threat Theory in an attempt to integrate different theoretical approaches on 
intergroup threat including realistic threat (1), symbolic threat (2), and negative stereotypes 
(3) but also threats to group esteem (4)and intergroup anxiety (5) (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). 
An increase in perceived intergroup competition with an OG, value violations and group 
esteem threat by the OG promote, according to the Integrated Threat Theory, intergroup 
anxiety and the importance of stereotypes which in turn entail an increase in negative attitudes 
toward the OG (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan & Stephan 1996). 
This chapter reviewed a selection of the social psychological literature that is highly 
relevant to the phenomenon of social discrimination. It was the main goal of this review to 
clearly define the specific aspect of social discrimination that the present research is focusing 
on: The intentional infliction of harm on members of a deviant OG. The following chapter 
introduces a second, quite different theoretical perspective on the infliction of harm on 
deviants. This research has so far been essentially unconnected with the presented social 
psychological literature. It focuses on research in the field of experimental economics that is 
largely concerned with the importance of cooperation in groups. The question is raised 
whether the infliction of harm on members of deviant subgroups might be interpreted as a 
process maintaining a group´s functionality and continuity. 
2.3.2 The Infliction of Harm on Deviants: Experimental Research on Punishment in 
Public Goods Games 
A diverse body of research in experimental economics has been dealing with the infliction 
of harm on deviants and its functional implications. In this line of research in experimental 
economics the question why humans punish deviants is closely related to the phenomenon of 
cooperation. Human cooperation is distinct from cooperation in other animal species which is 
mostly restricted to cooperation among genetically related individuals (Hamilton, 1964; Fehr 
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& Fischbacher, 2004a). Humans however developed a qualitatively different kind of 
cooperation: Cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals (Henrich & McElreath, 
2003). It might be speculated that the emergence of cooperation among genetically unrelated 
group members was intertwined with the increasing importance of ever larger groups. Group 
sizes exceeding families and village communities required new forms of cooperation. At the 
same time these new forms of cooperation assured the functionality of large groups of 
genetically unrelated individuals such as nations that would not have been feasible on the 
basis of mere kin-selection. But cooperation itself is a fragile phenomenon. Under which 
circumstances do members of a genetically unrelated group cooperate toward a common 
group endeavor? It might be argued that many group endeavors that require the cooperation of 
its group members might be conceptualized as Public Goods Games (e.g. Kollock, 1998; 
Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). 
2.3.2.1 Public Goods Game 
The initial example of protecting one´s country in a war constitutes a classic example of 
such a common group endeavor. The citizens of a country are faced with the decision to fight 
for their country or to defect. Fighting for one´s country is potentially costly as it implies the 
possibility of being wounded or killed in battle. Therefore, not participating in a war should 
be the preferable decision from an individual standpoint. However, if all citizens decided not 
to participate in the effort to protect their country the war would be lost. This should result in 
the second-worst outcome for citizens from an individual perspective - only second to being 
killed - as there is no payoff from the common group endeavor. Their country did not win the 
war but was instead conquered. On the upside they did not participate in the war and were not 
faced with the danger of being wounded or killed in battle. 
The reasoning behind this example of a common group endeavor can be conceptualized as 
a more formal Public Goods Game. In a Public Goods Game a group of participants is formed 
(n ≥ 2). All players2 are given an initial endowment e. Participants are then simultaneously 
faced with the decision of how much of this initial endowment they want to keep for 
themselves and how much they want to contribute to the Public Good. The sum of all 
contributions is then multiplied by a factor m that is larger than 1 and smaller than n. The 
product of all contributions and m is the total payoff to all participants. The total payoff is 
distributed equally among all players, regardless of their contribution. Every participant 
                                                 
2 Individuals participating in a Public Goods Game will furthermore be referred to as “players”. Individuals 
participating in a study will be referred to as “participants”. 
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receives m/n monetary units for every contributed monetary unit, m/n < 1 because m < n. This 
incentivizes free-riding. The individually rational decision would be to defect, to contribute 
nothing. If the other players contributed, a free-rider would receive a combined payoff of the 
kept initial endowment and his share of the total payoff from the Public Good (1). If all other 
players defected as well the free rider would receive at least the entire initial endowment (2). 
In both scenarios - (1) and (2) - the free-rider could not improve his payoff by changing his 
contribution decision. The collectively rational decision would be to contribute the entire 
initial endowment. If all players contributed their initial endowment the collective payoff, 
then n*(m*e) would be larger than the collective payoff if all players defected and kept their 
initial endowment n*e. A Public Good Game constitutes a Social Dilemma because of this 
antagonism of individual and collective rationale. 
A large body of research emphasizes the importance of specific social norms for the 
emergence and upkeep of cooperation in Social Dilemmas (e.g. Fehr & Gächter, 2004). One 
social norm prescribing cooperation, if the other members of a group cooperate as well, is the 
norm of conditional cooperation. Experimental evidence shows that many individuals tend to 
behave in a conditionally cooperative manner (e.g. Fehr & Gächter, 2004). Many of these 
conditional co-operators are more precisely imperfect conditional co-operators as they 
contribute slightly less than other co-operators. This indicates that norm adherence is curtailed 
by individual self interest. Another stable subpopulation of players in Public Good Games 
behaves in an individually rational manner and defects consistently. Both deviations from the 
conditional cooperation norm lead to a decreasing level of cooperation over time (Dawes & 
Thaler, 1988; Ledyard, 1996). But the introduction of two factors curbs the escalation of 
defection and seems to facilitate a high level of cooperation: The identifiability of individual 
contribution decisions and the possibility to punish non-contributors. A broad body of 
research has been able to show the positive effects of specifically targeted punishment on the 
level of cooperation in Public Good Games (Ostrom, 1992, 2000; Yamagishi, 1986; 1988; 
Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002). The introduction of a punishment option results in these studies 
not only in an immediate increase in cooperation, but also in a further increase in cooperation 
over time, thus reversing the cooperation pattern over time in a Public Good without a 
punishment option. The impact of a punishment option is twofold from a motivational 
perspective: First, the expectation that deviants will be punished creates a perspective of a 
high level of cooperation for potential co-operators and may be best described as an 
“attraction of cooperation” (1). The possibility of an impending punishment poses a threat to 
potential defectors and decreases the incentive to free-ride. This second implication of a 
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punishment option can be described as a “suppression of competition” (e.g. Price, Cosmides, 
& Tooby, 2002; Frank, 2003) (2). An application to the initial example of fighting of one´s 
country may illustrate these implications of a punishment option in a Public Goods Game. 
2.3.2.2 Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Games: An Example 
The protection of one´s country in a war has been introduced earlier as a typical group 
endeavor. However, individual defection constitutes a serious threat to this group goal. The 
introduction of a punishment option has been presented as a means of securing a high level of 
cooperation towards the group goal of protecting one´s country. Joining the army in case of a 
draft resembles cooperation with regard to this group goal. Desertion would amount to an act 
of defection with regard to this group goal. The individually rational decision would be to 
defect and “keep ones initial endowment”. This would mean in terms of the example to 
minimize the probability of being killed in an armed conflict and stay at home. At the same 
time one would hope that all other group members contributed and one´s group would win the 
conflict. If however all group members would follow this individual rationale the conflict 
would be lost, resulting in no additional payoff from the Public Good for anybody. The 
collectively rational decision would be to join the army and maximize the probability of 
winning the conflict. Given the fact that the initial endowment is the ultimate contribution of 
risking one´s life, traditional punishment options such as executions have to be equally severe 
to counterbalance the cost of contribution. The initial endowment in this example is not a 
positive amount of a positively valued resource but the probability p of a negative event not 
taking place, 1 - p(d), ones death d is assigned a set value of 1, the probability of this event p 
ranging from 0 to 1. The probability of being killed while staying at home equals 0 in this 
example. The payoff for defecting is therefore equal 1 if no punishment option exists. In the 
case of a punishment option in form of executions of deserters the payoff for defection is set 
to 0 by definition because death is certain in this case, p(d) = 1. The risk of being killed in 
battle is larger than 0. But it is still smaller than the certain execution in case of defecting. The 
individual payoff for contributing for this given punishment option is therefore larger than for 
defecting, 1 - p(d) ≥ 0, for any given p. In other words: Going to war with any probability of 
being killed is still preferable over being killed at home for sure as punishment for ones 
desertion. This implication of a punishment option has been described earlier as the 
“suppression of competition” (2). The decline in desirability of defection in case of a 
punishment option increases at the same time the expected probability of a high level of 
cooperation and thus a high additional payoff from the Public Good. The more individuals 
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decide that desertion is not worth the risk of being executed, the more individuals join the 
army and thus increase the probability of their country to win the war. This function of a 
punishment option has been described earlier as the “attraction of cooperation” (1). 
An option of punishing deviants may appear appealing with regard to establishing a high 
level of cooperation in a group. However, punishment is costly. This cost does not have to be 
of a monetary nature. But punishment requires the investment of resources such as time and 
energy. Punishment entails at the same time the risk of retaliation and emotional tensions. 
Norm deviations are in addition not always blatant. The detection of any norm deviation - 
respectively the individual or group committing it - requires time, information, money and 
effort. The notion that punishment is costly has another important theoretical implication. If 
punishment is assigned with a cost, punishment has to be limited in quantity and quality. A 
first question addresses the quantity of the punishment. The previously mentioned evidence 
illustrating the potential of punishment to increase levels of cooperation suggests that 
punishment is motivated by self-interest. Strict punishment of deviations improves the level of 
cooperation in the Public Good Game and results therefore in a higher individual payoff. 
Experimental evidence has lead to a perspective on motivations for punishing behavior that is 
deviating considerably from this self-interest perspective. Fehr and Fischbacher reported 
several studies on third-party punishment in line with the findings of Carlsmith and co-authors 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a). In a third-party punishment experiment a third person observes 
two others playing a Prisoner´s Dilemma Game. A  Prisoner´s Dilemma Game is basically a 
variation of a Public Good Game with two players that have the dichotomous decision 
between contribution and defection. As in the Public Goods Game defection is the 
individually rational and contribution the collectively rational choice. In a third-party 
punishment experiment an uninvolved person is first informed about the contribution 
decisions of the two players and then confronted with the option of costly punishment. There 
is not only no possibility for the third-party observer to profit by punishing one of the two 
players. Even more, the observer´s self-interest should obstruct the punishment of one of the 
two players because punishment is costly. This is however not the case. Fehr and co-authors 
could show that a considerable share of about 60 % of the observers punished violators of a 
distribution norm (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b). 
This theoretical and empirical research suggests in summary that the punishment of 
deviants might be seen as functional from the perspective of a superordinate group3. 
                                                 
3 A goal of a superordinate group will hence be referred to as “superordinate goal”. 
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Punishment incentivizes members of a group not to defect but to contribute to a group 
endeavor. The punishment of deviants is not only motivated by an individual´s self-interest 
utilizing it´s group as a mere proxy for the pursuit of its individual goals. The punishment of 
deviants might be seen as a measure to ensure a group´s functionality and thus preserve its 
continuity. 
2.3.2.3 Social Norms and Group Goals 
Fehr and Fischbacher define social norms as “[...] standards of behaviour that are based on 
widely shared beliefs how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation” 
(Fehr & Fischbacher 2004a). This particular definition of social norm is somewhat misleading 
as it is targeted at the particular “norm of strong reciprocity”. However, strong reciprocity 
might be better described as a strategy of norm enforcement. Goals on the contrary can be 
broadly defined as internal representations of desired states (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). A 
group goal is accordingly defined as an internal representation of a desired end state that is a 
part of a specific social identity. Social norms are sets of values, beliefs, attitudes and forms 
of behavior that are perceived as appropriate or inappropriate with regard to a group goal. The 
existence of a valid social norm implies that the group goal is shared by other members of the 
group. A socially shared social norm suggests even more importantly the possibility of 
negative social sanctions and therefore increases the probability of other group members´ 
norm compliance. At this stage strategies of norm enforcement - such as strong reciprocity - 
are highly crucial as they connect individual behavior with a relevant social norm that is 
implicitly or explicitly derived from a group goal. Strategies of norm enhancement incentivize 
individuals to behave in line with the “do´s and don’ts” that are defined by a specific social 
norm. The definition of desirable form of values, beliefs, attitudes and forms of behavior by a 
social norm again is most important for the achievement of a group goal. This perspective is 
in line with a functional approach to normative behavior that argues that social norms aid the 
accomplishment of group goals (Allison 1992; Campbell, 1975, Sherif, 1936; Sumner, 1906). 
Norms are according to this perspective neither arbitrary nor trivial but ultimately connected 
to the survival of a group in their capacity to encourage or prevent specific types of behavior. 
Social norms that do not aid any ultimate goal are not expected to be evolutionary stable 
(Schaller & Latane, 1996). Both group goals and social norms are important components in 
common group endeavors. Group goals define to a greater extent the “what”, the direction of 
the group goal and its motivational implications whereas social norms define the “how”. 




Strategies of norm enforcement such as strong reciprocity are pivotal as they ensure that 
individuals behave in line with specific norms, thus contributing appropriately to the common 
endeavor of the group goal. 
An example might illustrate this differentiation: Workers are defined as a group by the 
common group endeavor to negotiate better working conditions and higher wages. In order to 
achieve this group goal the group members participate in strikes or protest marches. This 
group goal might be described as a Public Goods Game in which a goal achievement, 
represented by higher wages and better working conditions, is symbolized by the additional 
payoff from the Public Good. Group members have to contribute shares of their initial 
endowment in order to achieve this group goal. In real life striking workers may contribute to 
the Public Good of the group goal by costly investments in terms of time spent on strike, 
money missed out on because of the missed working opportunities. The social norm would be 
to contribute to the group goal of striking by individuals investing these resources. Both 
striking workers as well as non-striking workers are included in the superordinate social 
category of workers even though they show different contribution patterns. The defection by a 
deviant group - such as strike-breakers - would be punished as it undermines the common 
group goal. 
This example might not only help to clarify some differences in terms of the used 
terminologies, but furthermore show that the two different theoretical approaches might be 
connected. From an OG-centric perspective the strike-breakers are discriminated as they are 
punished by the strikers for their perceived defection. The perceived interdependence (Esses 
et al. 1998; Esses et al., 2001) and possible negative implications for the success of the strike 
might serve as “aggravating” conditions justifying the infliction of harm on the members of 
this deviant OG4. However, the situation might be interpreted as an IG internal conflict from a 
functional perspective. The strikers have to punish defectors in order to keep a high level of 
cooperation and thus maximize the chances of group goal achievement. 
2.3.3 The Infliction of Harm on Deviant Groups: Summary 
Two different bodies of literature have been presented as a theoretical foundation of the 
present research. Both lines of research are highly relevant with regard to the infliction of 
harm on deviants. While social psychology has traditionally taken a rather descriptive 
                                                 
4 It is important to point out that no structural negative interdependence exists between both groups as a 
Public Goods Game constitutes a mixed-motive situation. 
18 
 
approach focussing on processes that might help explain the negative epitomizations of this 
phenomenon such as explicit discrimination and extreme forms of persecution and 
punishment of deviance in cases such as ethnic cleansings. Experimental economics - and 
evolutionary psychology - on the contrary have focussed largely on a normative perspective 
on the punishment of deviants. The punishment of deviants is often viewed as a mediating 
factor suited to increase levels of cooperation in groups. These two approaches vary at the 
same time with regard to the perspective they take on the infliction of harm on deviants and 
its subsequent evaluation. Social psychology´s view is often characterized by the perspective 
of a deviant OG that is confronted with being discriminated. The normative approach of 
experimental economics on the contrary focuses on these functional aspects of the infliction of 
harm on deviant. Punishment is seen as a factor that is crucial for the upkeep of cooperation in 
a group. It is nevertheless most important to emphasize that both lines of research are 
different approaches dealing with processes related to the same phenomenon, the infliction of 
harm on deviants. Both approaches may differ in terms of their methodology, terminology and 
general perspective, but they are far from being incompatible.  
The current research is connected to both approaches to the infliction of harm on deviants 
as it focuses on the extent of harm that is inflicted on members of a deviant group. It has been 
suggested that the representation of a superordinate goal as either minimal or maximal goal is 
crucial for the extent of harm that is inflicted on members of a group that is deviating from 
this goal. An empirically testable hypothesis is therefore derived from this theoretical 
assumption. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
2.4.1.1 Hypothesis 1: Goal-type Hypothesis 
It is expected that the deviation from a minimal superordinate goal leads to a higher level 
of harm inflicted on members of a deviant OG than the deviation from a maximal 
superordinate goal. 
2.4.1.2 Negative Emotions 
The infliction of harm on others is often triggered by emotional reactions such as moral 
outrage (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). An affective level of analysis appears 
therefore important in order to scrutinize the impact of goal-type on the extent of harm that is 
inflicted on members of a deviant OG. An important set of negative emotions has been 
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presented with the CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999). Rozin and 
colleagues propose a set of three negative emotions – contempt, anger and disgust (CAD) – 
and suggest that each of them is related to a specific moral code. Although distinguishable 
from each other these three emotions can generally be classified as a cluster of emotional 
reactions to moral violations. The deviation from a minimal goal should lead not only to a 
higher level of harm inflicted on members of a deviant group than the deviation from a 
maximal goal (goal-type hypothesis). The dichotomous structure of a minimal superordinate 
goal should also lead to a higher level of negative emotions toward the deviant OG than the 
deviation from a graded maximal goal. The higher level of negative emotions toward the OG 
should in addition be related to the behavioral reaction - the infliction of harm - thus 
mediating the main effect of goal-type of the superordinate goal on the infliction of harm on 
members of the deviant OG. 
2.4.1.3 Hypothesis 2: Negative Emotions Hypothesis 
It is expected that negative moral emotions toward the OG mediate the effect of goal-type 
of the superordinate goal on the degree of harm inflicted on members of the deviant OG.  
In the following chapter an experimental paradigm will be developed in order to test both 
goal-type hypothesis as well as negative emotions hypothesis.  
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3 Designing an Experimental Paradigm 
The basic question of the present research addresses the impact of the goal-type of a group 
goal (minimal versus maximal) on the infliction of harm on a subgroup that is deviating from 
this goal. An appropriate experimental paradigm is needed to answer this question. This 
experimental paradigm should incorporate a number of important methodological aspects. 
First of all it should allow the introduction of a superordinate goal5. Secondly, an intergroup 
context has to be introduced to allow the deviation of a subgroup from this superordinate 
goal. The experimental paradigm should allow the behavioral measurement of harm inflicted 
on the deviant subgroup in response to the deviation of this subgroup from the superordinate 
goal. The experimental paradigm has to feature a goal-type (minimal versus maximal) 
manipulation of the superordinate goal in order to assess the hypothesis that the deviation 
from a minimal superordinate goal leads to a higher level of harm inflicted on deviants 
compared to the deviation from a maximal superordinate goal. The entire experimental 
paradigm should be based on an experimental setup in order to exclude the influence of 
uncontrolled factors. The following chapters will address each of these desiderata and discuss 
how their practical operationalizations may be incorporated into a coherent experimental 
paradigm. 
3.1 Superordinate Goal 
Sherif´s aforementioned summer camp studies present a classic example of research on 
group goals and intergroup relations (Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955; Sherif, Harvey, White, 
Hood, Sherif, 1966). The Theory of Realistic Intergroup Conflict that was derived from these 
findings states that a negative interdependence between the goals of an IG and an OG results 
in negative attitudes and behavior towards the OG. The present research is in contrast not 
concerned with intergroup conflict on the basis of a negative interdependence between two 
groups. The focus of the present research is instead the infliction of harm on a subgroup that 
is deviating from a group goal that is potentially benefitting all group members. A Public 
Goods Game allows the introduction of such a group goal without the necessity of a zero-sum 
conflict. A Public Goods Game represents a basic form of a mixed-motive game. The 
                                                 
5  The term „superordinate goal“ will be used in the following to refer to the group goal of this superordinate 
group. 
Chapter 3 - Experimental Paradigm  21 
essential characteristics of a Public Goods Games have already been described earlier (see 
chapter 3). Players in a Public Good Game receive an initial endowment and are faced with 
the decision of how much of that initial endowment they want to contribute to a Public Good. 
The collectively rational choice would be to contribute the entire initial endowment to the 
Public Good as the Public Good benefits all players. It has been argued (see chapter 3) that 
every group goal may be conceptualized as a Public Goods Game. The Public Good - 
respectively the additional payoff from it - constitutes the group goal6. The present research is 
dealing with the infliction of harm on members of a deviant subgroup. The next section deals 
therefore with the introduction of an intergroup context: The notion that the superordinate 
group consists of members of one´s own group but also of members of a distinct OG. 
3.2 Intergroup Context: Social Identity  
The point of departure for the present research is a group striving for a common group 
goal. A subgroup is however deviating from this group goal, thus introducing the distinction 
between an ingroup (IG) that is conform to this superordinate goal7 and an outgroup (OG) that 
is deviating from this superordinate goal. Both IG and OG are included in a superordinate 
group (SOG) (Figure 1). It appears however reasonable from a methodological point to 
introduce this distinction between an IG and an OG included in a SOG prior to the actual 
deviation of the OG from the superordinate goal. These group categories may function on the 
event of the OG´s deviation as a “predetermined breaking point”. Introducing the intergroup 
context prior to the OG´s deviation should give participants greater clarity about the 
experimental situation and function at the same time as a basis for the attribution of the OG´s 
deviation (“Those who are different by definition are the ones that deviate from our common 
group goal.”). It is highly important to point out that this intergroup context should have no 
functional implications for the group goal. The intergroup context should also be as content-
                                                 
6  Contribution Decisions as an Indirect Manipulation Check of Group Goal. The contribution decision 
functions at the same time as a logical manipulation check for the goal-manipulation. A Public Goods Game is a 
case of a Social Dilemma. It does not make sense to contribute if a player does not believe that the other players 
will do the same. It only makes sense to contribute ones initial endowment in order to maximize ones payoff if 
one is convinced that the other players will do the same. A player´s decision to contribute to the Public Good 
indicates therefore not only the representation of a shared group goal of making money by contributing to the 
Public Good. It also indicates the expectation that other players will behave in line with the group goal of 
contributing to the Public Good. 
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free as possible to avoid the influence of factors such as stereotypes or the interaction history 
between the groups. 
 
Figure 1: Group Categorizations 
 
 
The Minimal Group Paradigm constitutes a prominent experimental baseline situation for 
a context-free intergroup situation (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Tajfel and co-
authors wanted to demonstrate that social categorization in itself is no sufficient condition to 
elicit intergroup discrimination in the form of IG favoritism. Six basic criteria were proposed 
for their Minimal Group Paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971; Diehl, 1990): 
1. There should be no face-to-face interaction whatever between the Ss, either in the 
ingroup or in the outgroup or between the groups. 
2. Complete anonymity of group membership should be preserved. 
3. There should be no instrumental or rational link between the criteria for intergroup 
categorization and the nature of ingroup and outgroup responses requested from the 
subjects. 
4. The responses should not represent any utilitarian value to the subject making them. 
5. A strategy of responding in terms of intergroup differentiation (i.e. favouring the 
ingroup and detrimental to the outgroup) should be in competition with a strategy 
based on other more “rational” and “utilitarian” principles, such as obtaining 
maximum benefit for all. A further step in this direction would be to oppose a strategy 
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of maximum material benefit to the ingroup to one in which the group gains less than 
it could, but more than the outgroup. 
6. Last but not least, the responses should be made as important as possible to the Ss. 
They should consist of real decisions about the distribution of concrete rewards 
(and/or penalties) to others rather than some form of evaluation of others.  
 
The following paragraph describes how these criteria of the Minimal Group Paradigm 
were adapted to the experimental paradigm of the present research. The operationalization of 
the Minimal Group Paradigm is identical for all studies. In the beginning of the main study 
participants are welcomed and taken to individual sound-proof booths. After the study 
participants are thanked and paid individually. There is no face-to-face contact or any kind of 
communication between the participants of the studies at any time during the study (criteria 1 
and 2). An intergroup context is introduced using a brief pretest during the recruitment of the 
participants several days in advance of the actual main study. The questionnaire consists of 
ten questions taken from the Freiburg Personality Inventory (Fahrenberg, Hampel, and Selg, 
2001) in a random manner (see Appendix: Group Categorization). These questions are neither 
related to each other nor to the subjective of the following main study. The group categories 
are therefore arbitrary. Participants are allegedly classified as members of one of two groups, 
a “beta-group” and a “gamma-group”. These groups are characterized as broad personality-
types, but no further information is given. All participants receive feedback that they have 
been classified as members of the “beta-group” (criterion 3). Both IG (“beta-group”) and OG 
(“gamma-group”) are included in a superordinate group (Figure 1). Participants cannot profit 
from any of their decisions on the dependent variables of the study (criterion 4). The 
decisions that are based on the group categories are comprised either of strong intentions (e.g. 
“A certain amount of money should be deducted from the OG´s payoff”) or actual behavioral 
choices (e.g. “0 - 9 € should be deducted from the OG´s payoff”; “Members of the OG should 
be excluded from the participation in future profitable studies.”) (criterion 6). These decisions 
are however not in competition with a strategy based on “rational” or “utilitarian” principles 
(criterion 5). The present research is - in contrast to the initial research in the framework of 
the Minimal Group Paradigm - focusing on the explicit infliction of harm on members of a 
deviant OG. The aims of these two lines of research are therefore clearly distinct from each 
other. The use of the Minimal Group Paradigm in the current research is purely 
methodological as it constitutes a well established context free technique to introduce an 
intergroup context. 
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It is important to point out that the introduction of minimal group categories has no 
functional implications in terms of interdependence between IG and OG. The functional 
relation between all participants is structured by the Public Good Game. All players are equal 
in this Public Good Game regardless of their group membership. The intergroup context 
introduced on the basis of the Minimal Group Paradigm serves simply as a “predetermined 
breaking point” on the onset of the OG´s deviation from the superordinate goal. The next 
section describes therefore the operationalization of the OG´s deviation from the described 
superordinate goal. 
3.3 Goal Deviation 
The operationalization of an OG deviation has to fulfil two basic criteria. The deviation 
from the superordinate goal has to be perceived to be directly related to group membership: 
The goal deviation should be identical across both minimal and maximal goal condition. All 
IG members should behave in line with the superordinate goal and all OG members should 
deviate from it (Figure 2). This poses a problem as group membership is based on the criteria 
of the Minimal Group Paradigm. It implies that there is “no instrumental or rational link 
between the criteria for intergroup categorization and the nature of ingroup and outgroup 
responses requested from the subjects”. There is no reason to assume that participants´ 
contribution decisions should vary systematically in line with their group membership. 
Participants´ contribution decisions should be subject to chance. The probability that the three 
members of the IG contribute in line with the superordinate goal and the three OG members 
deviate from it (see Figure 2) has to be considered very low. It is therefore the logical 
approach to the first criterion to stage the decisions of the other five players. The feedback 
about the contribution decisions of these five co-players can be manipulated in a way that the 
two fellow IG-players contribute at a level that is conform with the superordinate goal 
whereas the three OG-players deviate significantly from the superordinate goal (Figure 2). 
The OG-deviation could be kept exactly identical across both minimal and maximal goal 
condition by staging the contribution decisions of the co-players. But at the same time the 
question has to be raised if the use of deception is ethically justifiable in an experimental 
paradigm. 
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Figure 2: Goal Deviation Outgroup - Contribution Levels 
 
3.3.1 The Use of Deception in Experimental Studies 
Experimental games have been a matter of interest and research in both experimental 
economics and social psychology. Both disciplines do not only differ with regard to their 
particular research questions but also with regard to their specific ways of conducting 
research. Hertwig and Ortmann discuss a variety of systematic methodological differences in 
experimental economics and social psychology such as scripting (1), repeated trials (2) and 
financial incentives (3). A fourth difference has proven to be of particular sensitivity, dividing 
the social-scientific community into two opposing parties: The use of deception in 
experimental studies (4). The borders of those parties are to a large degree identical with the 
groups of experimental economists, who oppose the use of deception, even see it as an utter 
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taboo (Davis & Holt, 1993; Wilson, 2007), and the group of social psychologists who often 
support the use of deception - or at least do not condemn it - if it appears justified. 
3.3.1.1 Contra Deception 
The heated discussion can be divided along two main lines of argument, a functional and a 
moral one. Opponents of the use of deception in experimental studies (Hertwig and Ortmann, 
2001: Davis & Holt, 1993; Hey, 1991; Ledyard 1995) often argue that participants´ responses 
in experimental settings should only be motivated by intended financial incentives and not by 
unintended reactions to presumed deception that no systematic hypotheses exist for. This 
point is strengthened by the concern that the negative effects of the use of deception in one 
study might cause spill-over effect in future studies and could affect other studies using the 
same population of participants. This perspective perceives participants´ trust in the 
investigator of an experimental study - respectively the reputation of the investigator and 
social scientists in general - as a common good resulting in a higher reliability of measures in 
experimental studies. The individual researchers “moral hazard” is from this perspective the 
temptation to harvest this common good without investing the effort to abstain of deception, 
thus endangering the continuity of the commons (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). The moral 
dimension of the argument against deception is rather plain as deception is simply perceived 
to be immoral and unethical.  
3.3.1.2 Pro Deception 
Supporters of the use of deception have a somewhat different perspective. Kimmel states 
for example a widespread agreement in the field of Social Psychology that deception is often 
a methodological necessity (Kimmel, 1996). There are two main reasons to defend the 
practice of defection (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). The investigator might lose experimental 
control if participants are aware of the purpose of a study. This might be especially the case in 
research that is targeting normatively sensible phenomena such as prejudices. Participants 
might adapt their responses to the perceived social norm of not showing any prejudice for 
example towards minorities. The authors argue that there is a greater demand in the field of 
(social) psychology to use deception because psychologists are more interested in phenomena 
that might be affected by existing social norms (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Cook & 
Yamagishi, 2008). Secondly, deception can be used to produce situations of special interest 
that are unlikely to arise naturally, for example a situation that allows studying the bystander 
effect. The American Psychological Association proposes deception in its APA guidelines as 
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a last-resort strategy (American Psychological Association, APA, 2001). Many social 
psychologists and experimental sociologists agree that deception should only be used if 
necessary and should be avoided if possible (Cook & Yamagishi, 2008; Adair et al., 1985; 
Kelman, 1967). Surveys show that the use of deception in psychology has rather increased 
over the last decades (Adair, Dushenko, & Lindsay, 1985; Gross & Fleming, 1982). 
3.3.1.3 Discussion 
Supporters of the justified use of deception reject the moral stance that its use is immoral 
per se. Cook and Yamagishi turn this allegation around and suggest that it would be immoral 
not to conduct research that depends to a certain degree on deception (e.g. research on socially 
sensible issues such as xenophobia) (Cook & Yamagishi, 2008). Some proponents of the use 
of deception argue that some important research questions depend entirely on the use of 
deception (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968). Another rather general point of criticism to the 
argumentation against deception in general is that there are possibly other factors besides 
actual deception that have the exact same consequences as deception. There is - from a 
psychological perspective - no reason to assume that unconfirmed suspicion of deception 
towards an investigator and the resulting lack of trust should be restricted to studies that 
actually use deception. Such factors that might cause suspicion could be glitches in the 
programming of a study, flaws in the design of a study in general or the general assumption 
that economists or psychologists “cannot be trusted”. The result will be the same as if 
deception had been used if a participant is suspicious and if parts of the presentation of a 
study are considered to be “unconvincing” by this participant. This result will be most likely a 
drop of trust and an increased probability of deviating or unsystematic response patterns, 
regardless of the actual use of deception. Taking this argument to the next level, researchers 
demanding a ban of deception in experimental research should demand a ban of studies that 
are flawed with one of these factors that might lead to a similar drop in participants trust and 
the studies credibility as a study incorporating deception. It can be argued in a similar vein 
that not only deception affects results via a pollution of the subject pool. Methodological 
strategies conceived in order to avoid deception might have as well a strong impact on results 
(Cook & Yamagishi, 2008). Supporters of the justified use of deception argue not only against 
the functional but also against the moral concerns of the opponents of deception. Christensen 
criticizes that the empirical evidence for the disapproval of the use of deception is usually 
based on the testimonials of single participants (Christensen, 1988), and that hardly any 
serious empirical research on the effects of deception has been carried out by those who 
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criticize its use (Smith & Richardson, 1983). The author furthermore argues in a brief 
summary of some empirical evidence, that most kinds of deception have no negative, but 
rather positive effects on participants´ well-being. What is called deception by researchers 
might not even be perceived as deception by the participants but rather be considered as a 
necessary part of the research. These conclusions are however limited by more extreme 
examples of deception such as Milgram´s studies on obedience (Baumrind, 1985; Kelman, 
1967). Baumeister and colleagues report in keeping with the findings of Christensen that the 
debriefing after a rather serious deception does not necessarily have to bring about a 
detrimental effect. Participants performed especially well on a recall test that came after the 
debriefing. The knowledge about having been deceived obviously did not lead to any drop in 
motivation with regard to the experimental tasks or general disgruntlement (Baumeister, 
Twenge & Nuss, 2002: 2nd experiment). 
3.3.1.4 The Use of Deception in the Presented Experimental Paradigm 
The APA identifies in a pragmatic approach three conditions that legitimize the use of 
deception: (1) The investigator has to decide that the use of deception is justified and that 
alternative procedures are not feasible. (2) Participants must not be deceived regarding 
significant aspects of the study that would affect their willingness to participate such as 
physical risks and discomfort. (3) Any deception must be explained to participants preferably 
at the conclusion of their participation in a study but no later than the conclusion of the 
research. 
The behavior of the five co-players in the Public Good Game constitutes a critical aspect 
in the present research. The aim of this goal-deviation manipulation is that contribution 
decisions by the IG are perceived as in line with the superordinate goal and contribution 
decisions by the OG are perceived as deviations from the superordinate goal. But why is it so 
important that this baseline (all IG members contribute in line with the superordinate goal, all 
OG members deviate) is kept constant by the use of deception? First it cannot be assumed that 
the relation between the number of deviating players and the degree of harm inflicted on the 
OG is linear regardless of group membership. The deviation of two players regardless of 
group membership cannot be expected to lead to the same extent of harm inflicted on the OG. 
The deviation of two OG members will lead for example to a disproportionate increase in 
harm inflicted on the OG compared to the case of two deviating IG members. Secondly the 
target of interest of the basic research questions is the example of an entire deviating OG and 
not individual deviants. The goal deviation has to be attributed to the deviants OG 
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membership. The higher the heterogeneity of OG members with regard to their deviation from 
the superordinate goal the lower the probability that this deviation from the superordinate goal 
is perceived as an inherent feature of their OG membership. A clear attribution of the 
deviation from the superordinate goal to the deviants´ group membership is therefore crucial. 
It is however highly unlikely that this benchmark pattern (all members of the IG contribute in 
line with the superordinate goal and all members of the OG deviate from this superordinate 
goal) will occur by chance. One of the main reasons for the use of deception in experimental 
studies is to produce situations of special interest that are unlikely to arise purely by chance 
(American Psychological Association, APA, 2001). Staging the contribution decisions of the 
five other players is therefore justified in the case of the present research. The participants 
receive information that the members of the OG defected thus deviating from the 
superordinate goal. The aim of this deception is to create homogeneity of group behavior in 
order to attain a benchmark in which group membership and goal-deviation are clearly related 
(both other IG members contribute in line with the superordinate goal, all three OG members 
deviate significantly from this goal)8. 
3.4 Goal-type Manipulation 
It is the main hypothesis of the present research that the deviation of an OG from a 
minimal superordinate goal will lead to a higher level of harm inflicted on members of this 
deviant OG than the deviation from a maximal superordinate goal. The manipulation of goal-
type (minimal versus maximal) of the superordinate goal constitutes therefore a central 
component of the experimental paradigm. The superordinate goal has been operationalized as 
contributing to a Public Good in order to make money. Maximal goals are characterized by a 
graded evaluation relative to an ideal goal. The closer an event is relative to this ideal goal, 
the better its evaluation. Minimal goals on the contrary are defined by a threshold that 
separates a positive evaluation of an event from a negative evaluation. The evaluation of an 
event in terms of a minimal goal is therefore an “either/ or”-evaluation. A manipulation of this 
goal-type structure of minimal and maximal goals can be modeled using variations of a Public 
Goods Game. Both minimal and maximal goal manipulation follow the same basic principle. 
The superordinate goal is identical in both Public Goods Games: Making money by 
contributing collectively to the Public Good. A slight change in the structure of the Public 
                                                 
8 The exact feedback participants received about the contributions of the other alleged participants is given 
in the descriptions of the respective experiments. 
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Goods Game is causing players to perceive this group goal as a graded “the more the better”-
maximal goal or an “either/or”-minimal goal (see Figure 3). 
Minimal goal condition. A minimal goal is characterized by a dichotomous structure. The 
goal can either be fully achieved or not at all. In order to shape participants´ representations of 
the superordinate goal of contributing to the Public Good in such an “either/or” fashion a 
specific design of Public Good Game is introduced. A Step-Level Public Good9 is 
characterized by a threshold (Figure 3) that has to be reached in order for the Public Good to 
be supplied (Rapoport, 1985, 1987; Van De Kragt, Orbell, Dawes, 1983). If a specific 
contribution rate is reached each player receives a payoff from the Public Good. Reaching this 
contribution threshold is therefore positive. However, a significantly higher average 
contribution rate is not more positive, because the payoff from the Public Good is in both 
cases the same, no matter by how much the threshold is exceeded. An average contribution 
rate of less than the specified contribution threshold is negative because no player receives a 
payoff from the Public Good. The structure of this step-level Public Goods Game resembles 
therefore the “either/or” evaluation structure of a minimal superordinate goal. 
Maximal goal condition. A Graded Public Goods Game is characterized by a linear 
increase in payoff from the Public Good relative to the amount contributed by all players. The 
higher the contribution rate the linearly higher the payoff from the Public Good. The payoff 
from the Graded Public Goods Game resembles therefore the structure of a maximal “the 
more the better” superordinate goal. 
                                                 
9 Some authors (e.g. Van De Kragt, Orbell, Dawes, 1983) use the term “Minimal Contribution Set” is used. 
For the sake of clarity the term “step-level” Public Goods Game will be used henceforth. 
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Figure 3: Step-Level and Graded Public Goods Game  
 
3.5 Summary 
A methodological paradigm has been suggested to address the basic research question of 
this research: Does the deviance from a minimal goal deal to a higher level of harm inflicted 
on members of a deviant OG than the deviance from a maximal goal? A number of 
methodological aspects have been implemented in this experimental paradigm. It is synergetic 
as different aspects of experimental games in general and the Public Goods Game in 
particular are used to address a multitude of these aspects: The use of experimental games 
most importantly ensures a highly controlled experimental environment while allowing at the 
same time the measurement of actual negative forms of behavior such as punishment and 
social exclusion. Slight modifications of a Public Goods Game can be used to manipulate 
participants´ representation of a superordinate goal as either minimal or maximal. The 
following chapter presents a series of experiments using this experimental paradigm in order 
to test the impact of a minimal versus a maximal superordinate goal on the infliction of harm 
on a deviant OG. 
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4 Experimental Studies 
4.1 Study 1: Goal-type and Monetary Punishment 
This first study is supposed to create a basic realization of the previously conceptualized 
experimental paradigm. It is supposed to incorporate a number of criteria such as a 
superordinate goal, an experimental manipulation of participants´ goal-type representation of 
this superordinate goal, behavioral measures of harm as dependent variables, and an 
experimentally controlled environment. It is the main hypothesis that participants with a 
minimal representation of the superordinate goal will be more inclined to punish members of 
a deviant OG monetarily than participants with a maximal representation of the superordinate 
goal. A secondary hypothesis assumes that this effect of goal-type (minimal/ maximal) on the 
monetary punishment of deviants will be mediated by negative moral emotions10 toward the 
OG. 
4.1.1 Methods 
Design and Participants. This first experiment had one between subjects factor (goal-
type: minimal versus maximal goal). Forty students from the University of Jena participated 
in this study. The mean age was 22.85 years, SD = 2.43, range: 19-34; 22 of them female and 
18 male. Participants were randomly assigned either to the minimal, n =21 participants, or to 
the maximal, n =19 participants, goal-type condition. 
Goal-type Manipulation. Goal-type was manipulated by two different types of Public 
Good Games. In the minimal goal condition a step-level Public Goods Game was played. In 
order to receive a payoff from the Public Good at least four players had to contribute their 
initial endowment. This threshold resembled the basic structure of a minimal goal. In the 
maximal goal condition the payoff from the Public Good increased gradually with the number 
of contributing players thus resembling the basic structure of a maximal goal. 
Procedure. Participants were categorized as members of one of two minimal groups in a 
faked pretest (“beta-personality-type”). In the main study participants were welcomed and 
taken to individual sound-proof booths. No communication between participants was possible 
during the experimental session. The entire study took place via personal computer. 
                                                 
10 „Negative moral emotions toward the OG“ will be referred to as „negative emotions“ in the following. 
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Participants were told that their computer was connected to the computers of five other 
participants participating in the same session of the study. The basic rules of a Public Goods 
Game based on dichotomous contribution decisions were explained (minimal goal condition: 
Step-level Public Goods Game; maximal goal condition: Graded Public Goods Game).  
Trial round. Participants had subsequently an opportunity to compare the outcomes of 
different contribution-constellations in a test trial Participants were then asked a short 
standardized question regarding the game rules to assure their understanding of the rules of 
the Public Good Game.  
Main round. Participants were asked in a next step to make their contribution decision in 
the actual Public Goods Game. Participants were informed about the contribution decisions of 
their co-players and the deviation of the OG players from the superordinate group goal of 
contributing the initial endowment11. This goal deviation consisted of all three players 
defecting. The participants´ two other IG members contributed their initial endowment to the 
Public Good. These contribution decisions were staged. Participants were asked to answer a 
list of dependent variables immediately after the notification of the OG goal deviation. 
Participants were paid12, thanked and debriefed at the end of the study. 
4.1.2 Dependent Measures 
Monetary Punishment. Monetary punishment was measured on a seven-point scale13 
asking for participants´ inclination to deduct a share of payoff of the members of the OG (“A 
share of the payoff of the members with Gamma-personality should be deducted because of 
their decisions”). It was clear that there was no benefactor of this deduction and that it could 
only be interpreted as a punishment.  
Negative Emotions. Nine items measured the three distinct negative emotions anger, (“I 
am angry at the OG“, “I am annoyed by the OG“, “I am enraged by the OG”, Cronbach´s α = 
.83), contempt (“I disdain the OG“, “I condemn the OG“, “I am outraged by the OG”, 
Cronbach´s α = .87), and disgust (“The OG is disgusting me“, “The OG is sickening me“, “I 
find the OG revolting”, Cronbach´s α = .92).  
                                                 
11 The „superordinate goal of contributing the initial endowment“ will be referred to in the following as 
„superordinate goal“. 
12 The initial endowment participants kept and the payoff from the PG summed up to 2.99 € regardless of 
individual contribution rate and goal-type condition. This was achieved by keeping the exact amount of the 
initial endowment uncertain. 
13 All seven-point scales used in the present research range from “don´t agree at all = 1” to “strongly agree = 
7”. 
Chapter 4 - Experimental Studies  34 
Ingroup Identification. Participants´ identification with their IG was measured with four 
items: “I identify with my group”, “I consider myself a member of my group”, “I am glad to 
be a member of my group”, “I belong to my group”. The scale ranged from “don´t agree at all 
= 1” to “strongly agree = 7”. Identification with the IG was measured twice, once directly 
before the feedback about the OG deviation from the superordinate goal and once after this 
feedback and the other dependent variables. Identity (t1): Cronbach´s α = .86; Identity (t2): 
Cronbach´s α = .91. Participants´ identification with their IG, t1: M = 4.90; SD = 1.49, t2: M = 
5.06; SD = 1.39, was at both measuring points significantly higher than the midpoint of the 
scale, t1: t (39) = 3,81, p < .001; t2: t (39) = 4,80, p < .001. There was a main effect of goal-
type on the level of identification with the IG in t1, minimal goal: M = 5.32; SD = 1.33; 
maximal goal: M = 4.43; SD = 1.56, F (1, 39) = 3.771, p = .030, η2 = .09, as well as in t2, 
minimal goal M = 5.42; SD = 1.25; maximal goal: M = 4.66; SD = 1.57, F (1, 39) = 3.126, p = 
.042, η2 = .08. 
4.1.3 Results 
Goal-type and Infliction of Harm. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
independent between subjects factor of goal-type and the dependent variable of monetary 
punishment of the members of the OG yielded a significant main effect, F (1, 39) = 3.74, p = 
.031, η2 = .09. Participants in the minimal goal condition were more likely to punish the OG 
more severely, minimal goal: M = 4.48; SD = 1.86, than participants in the maximal goal 
condition, M = 3.21; SD = 2.28.  
Goal-Type and Negative Emotions. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
independent between subjects factor of goal-type and negative emotions toward the OG as 
dependent variable was conducted but no significant effect was found. Instead identification 
with the IG mediated the relationship between goal-type and monetary punishment of the OG. 
Goal-type had a significant relation with the level of identification in t2, β = -.28, p = .043, 
and with monetary punishment of OG members, β = -.30, p = .032, and the level of 
identification with the IG in t2 was significantly related to punishment of members of the OG 
independently of goal-type, β = .420, p = .007. When controlling for the level of identification 
with the IG in t2, goal-type had no significant effect on monetary punishment of OG-member, 
β = -.199, p = .1014. 
                                                 
14  Identification with the IG in t1 however did not mediate the relation between goal-type and punishment of 
the OG. 
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4.1.4 Discussion 
This first study confirmed the goal-type hypothesis. Participants in the minimal goal-
condition were more likely to punish members of the deviant OG than participants in the 
maximal goal condition. The negative emotions hypothesis however was not confirmed. 
Participants in the minimal goal condition did not report more negative emotions towards the 
OG than participants in the maximal goal condition. Instead the main effect of goal-type on 
monetary punishment of the OG was mediated by participants´ identification with their IG at 
t2 after the Public Good Game. There was no mediation of the effect of goal-type on the 
punishment of the OG by participants´ identification with their IG at t1. This process was 
unexpected. A replication of the effect of goal-type on the level of monetary punishment that 
was found in this first study appears crucial. A second study should clarify if the mediation of 
the effect of goal-type on the monetary punishment of the OG by IG identification is a 
systematic process or whether it should be rather attributed to the small sample size and a 
chance effect. Study 1 was in addition a first attempt to design and test a first design of the 
aspired experimental paradigm. Some general methodological issues need to be discussed in 
order to improve the overall experimental paradigm. 
Goal-type manipulation. An important point of criticism aims at the manipulation of goal-
type in this first study. The goal-type manipulation was based on a dichotomous contribution 
decision. Participants could either contribute their entire initial endowment or nothing at all. 
The dichotomous structure of this contribution decision has an intuitive fit with the idea of a 
minimal goal, a goal that can be fully achieved or not at all. But there is no such fit in case of 
a maximal goal representation. On the contrary, the contribution option allows individual 
players to act absolutely in favor of the superordinate goal by contributing the entire initial 
endowment or nothing at all. This might - at least in the maximal goal condition - constitute a 
goal-type manipulation on an individual level that conflicts with the goal-type manipulation at 
the group level. The manipulation of the superordinate goal as maximal might have been 
flawed by the dichotomous contribution structure at the individual level. 
Goal-setting. There were no clues for participants indicating that the superordinate goal of 
contributing to the Public Good in order to make money was a shared one. The experimental 
setup provided no information about the co-players except for their group-membership, no 
face-2-face interaction, and no option to communicate. Participants were thus confronted with 
a great deal of uncertainty regarding the behavior of the other players. However, participants´ 
trust that their co-players will contribute to the Public Good is essential for their own 
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contribution to the Public Good. The introduction of the group goal of making money by 
contributing to the Public Good should therefore be greatly improved if participants had more 
cues that this group goal is a shared one among group members. 
Deception and credibility. The experimental implementation of this first study 
incorporated a certain extent of deception in order to keep the degree of OG-deviation 
constant across all participants. The information participants received about the contribution 
decisions of their co-players were staged. Anecdotal reports by participants suggest that some 
of the participants doubted the authenticity of the interactions with the other players. Any 
doubts regarding the authenticity of participants´ interactions in this study are potentially 
detrimental to the results of a study as they may lead to unexpected patterns in terms of the 
dependent variables. Therefore an improved overall credibility of the study has to be another 
concern of a replication of this first study. 
Summary. Some conceptual concerns suggest that the goal-type manipulation of the 
superordinate goal used in this first study could be enhanced by avoiding a dichotomous 
contribution format for the Public Goods Game that might interfere with the goal-type 
manipulation. It has been argued that the abstract and minimal design of the study might have 
resulted in a suboptimal introduction of the superordinate goal of making money by 
contributing to the Public Good. Some cues that the goal of making money by contributing to 
the Public Good is a shared one among group members should reduce participants´ 
uncertainty and should improve the introduction of the superordinate goal. A second study 
should thus replicate the effect of goal-type on monetary punishment of members of a deviant 
OG that was found in this first study. Secondly, it should clarify whether this effect is 
mediated by identification with the IG or negative emotions towards the OG. This second 
study should be based on an improved design of the experimental paradigm used in Study 1. 
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4.2 Study II: Goal-type and Monetary Punishment: Replication 
The results of the initial study made clear that certain aspects of the experimental 
paradigm need to be improved. The most important enhancements are a more effective 
introduction of the superordinate goal, a more elegant goal-type manipulation, and an 
improvement of the overall credibility of the study because of the use of deception. It seems 
probable that it was not so much the occurrence of one systematic pattern that might have lead 
some participants doubt the authenticity of the players´ interactions in the Public Good Game 
of Study 1. But rather a co-occurrence of three of these patterns: The same number of 
participants from IG and OG were assigned to the same session (1), exactly three of six 
participants contributed and three defected (2) and all IG members contributed and that all 
OG members defected without exception (3). A first step to prevent suspicions by participants 
is therefore to inform participants that they were not randomly assigned to the sessions but 
that the pattern of three players from their IG and three players from the OG in one session 
was created deliberately. This way only two instead of three suspicious patterns co-occur. 
Another concern regarding the experimental paradigm used in Study 1 addressed the 
introduction of the superordinate goal of making money by contributing to the Public Good. 
The next section deals therefore with the improvement of the goal setting process. 
4.2.1 Goal-type Manipulation 
Some general methodological concerns and unexpected empirical findings in the first 
study call for an improved goal-type manipulation. One major point of criticism was the 
dichotomous contribution option that had rather a fit with the dichotomous structure of a 
minimal goal that was possibly obstructing a manipulation of the representation of the 
superordinate goal as maximal. A slightly different combination of contribution option and 
goal-type manipulation is therefore suggested for this second study. This approach utilizes a 
graded contribution option. As in the previous study a step-level Public Good Game is used in 
order to create a minimal goal representation and a graded Public Good Game to create a 
maximal goal representation of the superordinate goal. The main difference is that the 
contribution decision is not dichotomous but graded. Participants have the option to contribute 
between 0 % and 100 % of their initial endowment. The group goal is accordingly represented 
by an average contribution rate. The maximal goal is represented by an ideal average 
contribution rate of 100 %. The minimal goal is represented by a threshold of the average 
contribution rate of a certain percentage. This rate has to be exceeded in order to receive a 
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payoff from the Public Good. The threshold in the minimal goal condition in this study was 
set at an average contribution level of 60 % of the initial endowment. The basic approach of 
manipulating participants´ goal-type representation with slightly different designs of a Public 
Good Game is retained in principle. But participants in the maximal goal condition are no 
longer forced to make their contribution decision in a dichotomous “either/ or”-format that is 
rather fitting the structure of a minimal goal. The use of a graded contribution option should 
therefore result in a more coherent goal-type manipulation. A second positive effect of the 
graded contribution option is an increased overall credibility of the study. Feedback from 
participants of the first study suggested that it was the co-occurrence of certain patterns that 
raised their suspicions regarding the study and participants interaction in it. The fact that all 
IG-members contributed to the Public Good in the first study and all OG-members did not 
contribute constitutes such a pattern. The introduction of a graded contribution option allows 
a degree of variance within the groups. This variance should improve the overall credibility of 
the study. 
4.2.2 Introduction of a Superordinate Goal 
A third concern addresses the improvement of the introduction of the superordinate goal 
of collectively contributing to the Public Good. A broad variety of factors have been 
identified that have the capability of increasing participants´ probability to cooperate in Social 
Dilemmas. In his work on strategic solutions to social dilemmas Axelrod (1984) identified 
three basic requirements for cooperation to occur: 1. Individuals have to be involved in an 
ongoing relationship. 2. Individuals must be able to identify each other. 3. Individuals must 
have information how the other participants have behaved in the past. Participants had in the 
initial study of the present research no information if the goal of making money via 
contributing to the Public Good was a shared group goal until they received the feedback 
about the contributions of their co-players only seconds before the dependent variables. In 
these few seconds participants had to process the implications of the contribution decisions 
for the Public Good, the implications for their own payoff, they had to understand that therse 
contribution decisions were in line with the group identities, attribute these differences to the 
respective group membership and respond accordingly. This might have exceeded cognitive 
capacities or willingness of some of the participants which in turn might have had a 
detrimental effect on their representation of contributing to the Public Good as a superordinate 
goal. Participants might need a little more information and time to process this information in 
order to achieve a less ambiguous, more reliable introduction of the superordinate goal. The 
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introduction of the superordinate goal of contributing to the Public Good and the actual 
deviation from this goal by the OG should therefore be separated. 
The superordinate goal of collectively making money via contributing to the Public Good 
should be introduced in the first round of the Public Goods Game. In this first round only 
members of the IG play, contributing a considerable share of their initial endowment15. This 
first round serves the purpose to inform participants with a minimal amount of information 
that the other players in their own group followed the same contribution goal and do what 
they say. Participants are therefore - referring to Axelrod´s stated conditions for cooperation 
to occur - 1. involved in an ongoing relationship 2. with the ability to identify the other 
players individually with a letter-code and more importantly as members of their IG and 3. 
receive information that these members of their IG contributed to the Public Good. This 
should decrease the level of uncertainty regarding the superordinate goal, support 
participants´ perception of contributing to the Public Good as a shared superordinate goal and 
increase contribution decisions in line with this goal. 
4.2.3 Methods 
Design and Participants. This second study had one between subjects factor (goal-type: 
minimal versus maximal goal). Sixty students from the University of Jena participated in this 
study. The mean age was 22.08 years (SD = 3.51, range: 18-35); 42 of them female and 18 
male. Participants were randomly assigned to a minimal (30 participants) respectively 
maximal (30 participants) goal-type condition. 
Procedure. The basic experimental setup was the same as in the first study. The following 
description of the procedure used in this second study addresses therefore only aspects that 
changed compared to the first study. 
Introduction Superordinate Goal. Participants were asked in an initial trial round to 
contribute an amount between 0 % and 100 % of their initial endowment. Participants knew 
neither the exact amount of the initial endowment nor the exact number of rounds played. 
Participants were notified a few seconds after their own contribution decision that the other 
two members of their IG had contributed 70 % and 90 %. They were then informed about the 
average contribution rate of all three players, the amount of money kept and the payoff from 
the common account. By varying the exact amount of the initial endowment payoffs for all 
                                                 
15 The exact level of the contributions reported to the participants is given in the descriptions of each of the 
respective experiments. 
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participants could be kept at exactly the same level16. Right after the end of the first round the 
second round started. It was played by all six members of the SOG. Shortly after their own 
contribution decision participants were notified about the contributions of their five co-
players. The information about the contribution levels of their co-players was exactly the 
same for all participants, across goal-type conditions. Participants were notified that the two 
other members of their IG contributed 60 % respectively 80 % of their initial endowment, 
thus keeping in line with the group goal. The members of the OG contributed only a relatively 
small amount of their initial endowment (10%, 30% and 40 %) thus committing a goal-
deviation17. The average contribution rate was calculated for both IG and OG and displayed. 
Participants were asked afterward to answer a set of dependent variables. After the study 
participants were paid, thanked and debriefed. Contribution Decisions. Second round 
contributions were similar in the second round that was allegedly played by participants from 
both IG and OG. Participants in the minimal goal condition contributed on average 71 % SD 
= 14.37, of their initial endowment, participants in the maximal goal condition 76 %, SD = 
21.61. 
4.2.4 Dependent Measures 
Monetary Punishment. Monetary punishment was measured on a seven-point scale asking 
for participants´ support of a partial deduction of payoff for the members of the OG in the 
same way as in the previous study. 
Negative Emotions. A combined scale of negative emotions towards the OG comprised of 
three items was designed. The items were targeted directly at the OG (“I am mad at the 
Gamma-group”, “I am outraged by the Gamma-group”, “I think the Gamma-group is 
disgusting”).  
                                                 
16 The initial endowment participants kept and the payoff from the PG summed up to 2,99 € regardless of 
individual contribution rate and goal-type condition. This was achieved by keeping the exact amount of the 
initial endowment uncertain. 
17 All participants received in the initial trial round a payoff of 3,00 Euro (kept share of the initial 
endowment + payoff from the Public Good), regardless of goal-type condition and their individual contribution 
decision. This was achieved by varying participants´ initial endowment relative to their contribution decision. In 
the second round two variables had to be adjusted: Participants total payoff from the main round (kept share of 
the initial endowment + payoff from the Public Good) and the amount of money participants missed out on 
because of the OG´s deviation of the superordinate goal. Participants´ total payoffs in the main round varied 
between 2,88 Euro and 3,45 Euro in the maximal goal condition and between 2,66 Euro and 3,00 Euro in the 
minimal goal condition. 
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Ingroup Identification. Participants´ identification with their IG was measured before the 
Public Goods Game on 4 items: “I identify with my group”, “I consider myself a member of 
my group”, “I am glad to be a member of my group”, “I belong to my group”18. Participants´ 
identification with their IG, M = 5.25; SD = 1.40, was significantly higher than the centre of 
the scale, t (59) = 6,913, p < .001. There was no main effect of goal-type on level of 
identification, neither at t1, β = -.05, p = .717, nor a t2, β = -.02, p = .891. 
4.2.5 Results 
Goal-type and Infliction of Harm. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
independent between subjects factor of goal-type condition yielded a significant effect on 
punishment of OG-members by deducting money from them, F (1, 59) = 5.61, p = .011, η2 = 
.09. Participants in the minimal goal condition punished the OG significantly stronger than 
participants in the maximal goal condition, minimal goal: M = 4.53; SD = 2.06; maximal goal: 
M = 3.30; SD = 1.97. 
Goal-Type and Negative Emotions. Participants in the minimal goal condition reported 
significantly more negative emotions with regard to the OG than participants in the maximal 
goal condition, F (1, 59) = 4.67, p = .018, η2  = .08, minimal goal: M = 3.77; SD = 1.53; 
maximal goal: M = 2.92; SD = 1.50. In order to test the indirect effect bootstrapping was used 
(N=2000) to determine the standard error (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008). The indirect effect 
of goal-type on the dependent variable monetary punishment was mediated through negative 
emotions towards the OG, BCa (95%) = [-1.1749, -.0330]. 
4.2.6 Discussion 
The main hypothesis could be confirmed in this second study, replicating the finding of 
Study 1: Participants in the minimal goal condition punished members of the OG more 
severely for their deviation from the superordinate goal than participants in the maximal goal 
condition. This process was not mediated by the level of identification in t2 as in the first 
study, but by negative moral emotions towards the OG. This difference in results might be 
attributable to the remodelled goal-type manipulation. This more precise manipulation of 
goal-type and the improved overall design of this second study might have helped to reveal 
negative emotions as the mediator of the effect of goal-type on harm inflicted on the OG as it 
was initially hypothesized. 
                                                 
18 All analyses with the independent variable goal-type are one-tailed analyses in this chapter. 
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There was nevertheless a minor but possibly important difference in the goal-setting 
between minimal and maximal goal condition. The ideal goal in the maximal goal condition 
was set by logic. The goal of making money by contributing to the Public Good as a group 
suggests that the ideal average contribution rate is 100 % of the initial endowments. In the 
minimal goal condition in contrast a threshold of 60 % of average contributions was given by 
rule as superordinate goal. The differences in payoff between the step-level Public Good 
Game and the graded Public Good Game were minimized by keeping the exact amount of the 
initial endowment unknown. The remaining differences did not affect the results of this study. 
But some psychological differences remain nevertheless. The goal in the maximal goal 
condition was implied indirectly by logic. The superordinate goal in the minimal goal 
condition was given by game rule respectively the experimenter. It could be argued that the 
additional factor of authority increased participants´ tendency to punish deviants from this 
goal. This could have been the case either because a deviation from a superordinate goal 
given by rule and external authority appeared more severe or simply because the punishment 
of such a transgression was easier to justify. But the precise process of a possible impact of 
the factor “source of superordinate goal” (logic versus rule) on the extent of punishment of 
deviants is only secondary. It is more important to note that the factor “source of 
superordinate goal” is a possible alternative explanation for the effect of goal-type on the 
severity of monetary punishment found in this second study. Future studies will have to 
control experimentally for the source of the superordinate goal as a potential confound of 
goal-type. 
A number of implications for a follow-up study have been identified. The effect of goal-
type on monetary punishment has been shown and replicated in the first two studies. It seems 
therefore advisable to test if the scope of this effect of goal-type on punishment of the OG can 
be extended to other forms of harm inflicted on members of a deviant OG. In addition another 
replication of the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on a deviant OG appears 
necessary. In the first study identification with the IG mediated the effect of goal-type on 
monetary punishment. In the second study no such mediation could be found. The effect of 
goal-type on monetary punishment was instead mediated by negative emotions as initially 
hypothesized. Another replication might help to clarify the relation between goal-type and the 
infliction of harm. This replication should control in addition the “source of superordinate 
goal“ as a potential alternative explanation for the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm 
on the deviant OG. 
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4.3 Study III: Social Exclusion 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This third study is set to address multiple aims. First of all the source of the superordinate 
goal has to be controlled for as a possible confound of the factor goal-type manipulation. This 
addresses a major methodological concern of the second study. A new goal-selection 
mechanism is therefore presented. It is over and above another aim of this study to exclude 
differences in the payoffs in minimal and maximal goal condition as possible alternative 
explanations for the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm. This third study should help 
last but not least to clarify the processes of the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on 
members of a deviant OG: Is it mediated by identification with the IG - as the first study 
suggested -or by negative moral emotions towards the OG -as the second study implied? This 
third study is in addition supposed to test if the impact of goal-type can be extended to other 
forms of harm than monetary punishment. The exclusion from a superordinate group 
constitutes such an alternative form of harm. This study will therefore introduce the social 
exclusion of members of the OG that are present in a session (social exclusion) as well as the 
social exclusion of members of the OG, that are not present in a session (generalized social 
exclusion) as new dependent variables. 
4.3.2 Social Exclusion 
Various forms of harm that might be inflicted on members of a deviant OG in an 
experimental context have already been mentioned. These forms of harm - such as unpleasant 
noise (Mummendey et al, 1992) or monetary fines (Fehr & Gächter, 2004) involve a direct 
cost against the will of their target. The following chapter presents another archetypical form 
of harm: Social exclusion. Social exclusion might be defined as the exclusion of individuals 
from a social group against their will. One of its crucial characteristics is its capacity to 
facilitate harmful treatments of others as it removes them from the normative and moral 
protection of their group membership. The following chapter will therefore review some of 
the literature on the phenomenon of social exclusion both from the perspective of the 
excluded as well as the excluding. 
4.3.2.1 The Phenomenon of Social Exclusion: Motivation for Inclusion 
Being excluded from a social group is usually seen as an extremely negative event that is 
often associated with painful emotional experiences. The fact that being excluded has such a 
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negative valence raises the question why inclusion in a specific social group is so highly 
estimated. It has been argued on many occasions and for many social species that the 
inclusion in groups provides individuals with resources that prove advantageous with regard 
to survival, mating and raising offspring. Protection against the forces of nature such as 
predators and rivaling groups but also the division of labor are just some examples of the 
positive effects of groups. The lack of social inclusion on the flipside might as well imply 
severe consequences as some examples of research on social exclusion among primates might 
illustrate. Infants of highly socially integrated baboons have been shown to be more likely to 
grow older than age one than infants of less socially integrated mothers (Silk, Alberts, & 
Altmann, 2003). Kling and colleagues showed furthermore that vervets and rhesus monkeys 
who showed a low interest in social contact as a result from brain site lesions were often 
excluded after re-release to the wild and died without the protection of their conspecifics 
(Kling, Lancaster, & Benitone, 1970). This research supports the general idea that a strongly 
integrated social live increases the chances of surviving, reproducing, and raising offspring to 
a reproductive age among social animals. The observation that humans as one kind of social 
animal benefit from social inclusion in a broad sense via discriminative cooperation has found 
support from a variety of theoretical perspectives. In contrast to these approaches the same 
argument has been made from less ”gene-centric” approaches from a rather socio-biological 
or economic, individual-focussed background. These approaches argue that sociality has not 
developed as an afterthought, an update to individual psychological processes but rather that 
the inclusion in groups constitutes a crucial part of the environment the human psyche 
evolved in. Cognition and sociality are from this perspective inextricably intertwined 
(Caporael, 1997). The observation that people have a powerful need to belong may be seen, 
following this line of reasoning, as the result of an adaptive process that was shaped by the 
importance of sociality and groups as crucial factors in the environment (e.g. Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995; Maslow, 1968). Social exclusion constitutes a fundamental threat to this need. 
However there are two sides to the phenomenon of social exclusion, the excluded and the 
excluding. 
4.3.2.2 Being Excluded: Consequences of Social Exclusion 
Ample research has highlighted the potentially detrimental effects of the experience of 
being excluded from a social group. The following short review of research on the effects of 
being excluded might illustrate the scope and severity of the experience of being excluded. 
Along the many negative effects of the experience of being excluded from a social group is an 
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increased probability to take irrational, self defeating risks, choose unhealthy over healthy 
behaviors and show a greater tendency to procrastinate (Twenge, Catanese & Baumeister, 
2002). Stillman and colleagues showed in a series of studies, that social exclusion affects the 
global perception of life as meaningful in a negative way (Stillman, Baumeister, Lambert, 
Crescioni, DeWall, Fincham, 2009). The prospect of social exclusion might even affect basic 
cognitive capacities. Participants who were told they would end up alone in live showed a 
significantly decreased performance in complex cognitive tasks such as logic and reasoning 
(Baumeister, Twenge & Nuss, 2002; see also: Twenge, Catanese & Baumeister, 2003) as well 
as decrements in the effort of self-regulation (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco & Twenge, 
2005). This effect was specific to social exclusion and not mediated by mood. Similarly 
Twenge and colleagues showed that the expectation of ending up alone later in life had a 
negative effect on feelings of empathy towards a person in need of help, leading to a reduction 
in prosocial behavior. This result was replicated in a mixed-motive game where being socially 
excluded led to a lower level in empathy with the co-player and a significantly lower level in 
cooperation (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007). 
Socially excluded participants reported even under superficial conditions such as a simple 
ball tossing game lower levels of belonging, self esteem, control perception and meaningful 
existence (Williams, Cheung & Choi, 2000). These results could be replicated in a computer 
based version of the ball throwing game, the “cyberball”-paradigm (Williams & Jarvis, 2006). 
Comprehensive research highlights ostracism19 (Williams, 1997) as a factor increasing 
aggression towards others (DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009; Twenge, 
Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001). Chow and colleagues pointed out the importance of 
specific anger in response to the exclusion as a mediator for antisocial behavior (Chow, 
Tiedens & Govan, 2007). Williams and co-authors showed that the relation between the 
experience of being ostracized and aggression is moderated by threats to individual control 
needs (Warburton, Williams & Cairns, 2006). The perception of social exclusion as painful 
seems to be so stable that not even mitigating circumstances such as a cost for inclusion and 
retaining money for social exclusion change this relation (van Beest & Williams, 2005). 
Ostracism might even lead to emotional distress when it is inflicted by a disdained OG 
(Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). The importance of inclusion in social groups for humans 
has been described earlier. It might be argued similarly that threats to the social inclusion and 
                                                 
19 Ostracism may be defined as being ignored and often occurs without explanation or the explicit infliction 
of harm. However, it has been pointed out that virtually no empirical research points to different implications of 
ostracism and social exclusion (Williams, 2007). Both terms are accordingly often used interchangeably. 
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threats to physical wellbeing share respectively the resulting social and physical perceptions 
of pain. A connection of this highly negative affect to social exclusion might be interpreted 
from an evolutionary perspective in a similar way as the main function of physical pain. 
Physical pain serves as a cue to react to a threat to an individual´s physical integrity (e.g. the 
pain resulting from a thorn about to pierce the skin). Similarly social pain may be interpreted 
as a cue reminding the individual of the negative implications of being socially excluded (e.g. 
Krebs, Stephens, & Sutherland, 1983). Herman and Panksepp (1978) suggested that 
neurological processes for separation distress would represent an evolutionary elaboration of 
an endorphin-based pain network (Hermann & Panksepp, 1978; Panksepp, 1998). The 
perception of social pain affect fulfills according to MacDonald and Leary two important 
functions in terms of social regulation needs. First it enables a learning process to take place 
in order to avoid inclusion-threatening situations and minimize the probability of actual 
exclusion. Secondly a close connection of pain and threat-defense response mechanisms 
should enable a quick link between social exclusion cues (Kerr & Levine, 2008) and 
defensive reactions to regulate the individual´s social inclusion status (MacDonald & Leary, 
2005). A neuroimaging study conducted by Eisenberger and colleagues supports this 
assumption that the neurological bases of social pain are similar to those of physical pain 
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, Williams, 2003). Further research showed that the baseline 
sensitivity to physical pain predicts the sensitivity to social rejection and that the heightened 
social distress increases the sensitivity to physical pain (Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman & 
Naliboff, 2006), thus gaining more evidence in support of the assumption that pain distress 
and social distress share neurological substrates. Zhong and Leonardelli could show in line 
with theories on embodied cognition that the experience of social exclusion is not only 
proverbially but literally “cold”. Participants in an experiment recalling a social exclusion 
experience gave lower estimates of room temperature and had a greater desire for warm food 
and drink than participants that were included in a social group (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). 
4.3.2.3 Excluding Others: Social Exclusion as a Pathway to the Infliction of Harm on Others 
But what about the perspective of the excluding group members (for an overview: Fritsche 
& Schubert 2009)? Many reasons incentivize social exclusion from a functional perspective. 
A first - although somewhat trivial - point is based on the logical observation that there is no 
inclusion without exclusion. “In order for sociality to be functional, there must be “brakes” on 
sociality” (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Further reasons for social exclusion to appear are 1. from 
an evolutionary perspective the avoidance of diseases, 2. the fact that the excluded individuals 
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have proven to be unreliable cooperation partners in important group endeavors or simply 3. 
that a higher gain can be achieved for the remaining group members by exploiting the 
excluded group members (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). All reasons for social exclusion however 
boil from a functional perspective down to the simple tradeoff between the exclusion of 
dysfunctional group members and the possible costs accompanying the exclusion of group 
members in question and the costs of keeping them included. The factors influencing this 
tradeoff are often not as clear-cut as for example in the case of incapacitation via 
imprisonment of criminal offenders (e.g. Zimring & Hawkins, 1995; Darley, Carlsmith, & 
Robinson, 2000). The functionality of social exclusion should therefore be narrowly defined 
as functional in relation to a specific group goal. Social exclusion serves a function equivalent 
to a punishment option if a group goal is conceptualized as a Public Goods Game: Being 
excluded represents a possible cost for defectors. The mere threat of being excluded from a 
group shifts the cost/benefit tradeoff for defection, thus rendering defection more expensive 
and therefore less attractive. An option to exclude defectors respectively low cooperators in a 
Public Goods Game framework should therefore result in higher levels of cooperation for the 
remaining group members. Potential processes for this effect are the incapacitation of 
excluded defectors and a shift in incentives to cooperate for the remaining group members 
(Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Vidmar, 1974, Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974). 
Social exclusion can also facilitate the infliction of harm on others such as torture, killing 
or even genocide that would be unthinkable and unjustifiable for members of a shared IG 
(Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Staub, 1989). Moral exclusion constitutes a specific 
form of social exclusion that has been defined as the exclusion of individuals or groups from 
one´s scope of justice (Opotow, 1990, 1995). The inclusion in a group implies the application 
of certain moral standards to its members. Violations of these standards have to be justified. 
The moral exclusion of individuals and groups from this protective shield of a group 
membership enables the legitimate infliction of harm on any excluded individuals of groups. 
This may imply in extreme cases a categorization of deviants into extremely negative social 
categories which are excluded from the ultimate group of humanity thus removing its 
members from the moral protection affiliated with being human (Bar-Tal, 1989; Haslam, 
2006; for a perspective of the target: Brock & Haslam, 2010). Because of this significant 
importance of social exclusion as a specific form of harm, two measures of social exclusion 
are introduced in this third study: the social exclusion of members of the OG that are present 
in a session (social exclusion) as well as the social exclusion of members of the OG, that are 
not present in a session (generalized social exclusion). 
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This third study features in addition a methodological improvement. A goal-setting 
process is introduced in order to keep the source of the superordinate goal constant across 
minimal and maximal goal condition, thus addressing a major methodological concern of the 
second study.  
Goal-type manipulation and Group-goal setting. The goal-type manipulation was 
identical to the one used in the second study. In this study no explicit superordinate goal the 
60 % threshold in the minimal goal condition of the second study was given. Instead a goal 
setting mechanism was introduced. Participants were told that the group could set a strictly 
nonbinding, informal goal, for an average contribution level. One participant was allegedly 
picked at random by a computer program in order to propose such a superordinate goal 
represented by an average contribution level between 10 % and 100 %. The other two 
participants could either accept or reject this contribution goal. It was not made explicitly 
clear if the actual scope of this informal goal was only the IG or if it was communicated in the 
entire SOG (IG and OG). Every participant was “chosen” as the player to propose this group-
goal. Participants received subsequently a short feedback, that both IG co-players had 
accepted the proposed contribution goal, regardless of the exact level of this goal. This 
selected goal functioned in the minimal goal-type condition as the threshold that had to be 
reached in order to receive a payoff from the Public Good. Contribution Decisions. 
Participants in the minimal goal condition contributed on average 62 % of their initial 
endowment, SD = 22.98, and 75 % in the maximal goal condition, SD = 17.11. 
Goal Deviation: The selected superordinate goal was supported by the contribution 
decisions of the two IG-players who contributed at least at the level of the superordinate goal. 
The goal-deviation of the OG was adapted to the selected superordinate goal. The perceived 
magnitude of harm has been shown to have a decisive impact on the extent of responding 
punishment (Carlsmith et al., 2002). The relative goal-deviation (magnitude of harm) was 
therefore controlled for. The entire OG contributed always half of the superordinate goal (e.g. 
if the selected superordinate goal was 80 % the three players of the OG contributed on 
average 40 %). This proportionate relation of superordinate goal and average contribution 
level of the OG was chosen instead of a linear relation20. The relative deviation of the OG was 
                                                 
20 A linear relation would have meant that the absolute difference between selected superordinate goal and 
average OG-contribution had been kept constant. The proportionate relation seems more appropriate in order to 
keep the various levels of eligible superordinate goals comparable. This way the relative magnitude of harm 
inflicted by the OG can be kept constant across all eligible goal levels. Example: If an average contribution level 
of 80 % is selected as superordinate goal, the OG contributes on average 40 %, thus committing a goal deviation 
of contributing on average only half of the aspired superordinate goal. If an average contribution level of 40 % 
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therefore constant not only across goal-type conditions but also across the different levels of 
the selected superordinate goal. 
Goal-type Manipulation. The same goal-type manipulation was used as in the second 
study. Three items assessed on a seven-point scale participants´ representation of the goal-
type, e.g. “The average contribution level of […] must be achieved”; “The average 
contribution level of […] should ideally be achieved”; Cronbachs α = .67. The items were 
adjusted to the contribution level participants had chosen previously. Participants in the 
minimal goal condition scored significantly higher on the goal-type manipulation check, F (1, 
46) = 6.410, p = .015, η2 = .12, indicating a stronger minimal goal representation than 
participants in the maximal goal condition, minimal goal: M = 5.28; SD = 1.16; maximal goal: 
M = 4.35; SD = 1.34. 
4.3.3 Methods 
Design Participants. This third experiment had one between subjects factor (goal-type: 
minimal versus maximal goal). Forty-seven students from the University of Jena participated 
in this study. Thirty-five participants were female, 12 male. The mean age was 21.87 years, 
SD = 1.92, range: 18-27. 
Procedure. The basic experimental setup was the same as in the second study. The 
following description of the procedure used in this third study addresses therefore only 
aspects that changed compared to the second study. 
Trial Round. The superordinate goal was set as described above. Players were informed 
that the first round was played only by members of their own IG. Participants were asked to 
contribute an amount of their initial endowment between 0 % and 100 %. Participants knew 
neither the exact amount of the initial endowment nor the exact number of rounds played. 
Participants were informed about the contribution decisions of their IG-members a few 
seconds after their own contribution decision. These contribution decisions were related to the 
chosen group goal-level. One of the two IG-members always contributed at the goal-level 
(e.g. 40 % if a superordinate goal level of 40 % had been selected) and the other IG-member 
contributed 10 % above the superordinate goal level (e.g. 50 % if a superordinate goal level of 
40 % had been selected). Participants were then informed about the average contribution rate 
                                                                                                                                                        
was selected as superordinate goal, the OG contributes on average 20 %, thus committing a goal deviation of 
contributing only half of the aspired superordinate goal. The relative goal deviation is the same regardless of the 
level of the selected superordinate goal. 
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of all three players and the payoff from the Public Good. All participants received - regardless 
of their own contribution-decisions - 4 Euros from the first round. 
Main Round. The second round with all six players started right after the first round. 
Participants were notified about the contributions of their five co-players shortly after their 
own contribution decision (0 % - 100 % of their initial endowment). The information about 
the contribution levels of their co-players was exactly the same across both goal-type 
conditions. Participants were notified that the two other members of their IG had contributed 
at the selected superordinate goal level respectively 10 % above it, thus keeping in line with 
the superordinate goal. The members of the OG contributed only half of the selected group 
goal, thus committing a goal-deviation. The average rate of contribution was calculated for 
each subgroup and displayed. Participants in both conditions received 2.50 € in the second 
round21. All participants received therefore exactly the same feedback about their payoffs 
regardless of goal-type condition. All participants received a total amount of 6.50 Euro for 
their participation in the study. 
4.3.4 Dependent Measures 
Monetary Punishment. The same measure of monetary punishment of the OG was used as 
in the previous studies. Two measures of exclusion were added as further examples of harm 
inflicted on the deviant OG.  
Social Exclusion. The first measure of exclusion measured on a seven-point scale if 
participants wanted to exclude the OG from future rounds (“The group with Gamma-
personality should be excluded from future rounds because of their decision”). 
Generalized Social Exclusion. A second item measured the generalized social exclusion of 
OG-members from the SOG. This item was introduced as a separate study and was assessed 
after the actual computer-based study in a pen-and-paper format. Participants were told a 
cover-story that explained why they had to select eight participants for a future study from a 
data-base containing participants of former studies willing to participate in future, highly 
profitable studies. Although participants of the alleged earlier studies were kept anonymous 
on the list, their group-identity as either members of the beta- or gamma-group was evident. 
There was a time gap of about 10 minutes between the first exclusion item right after the 
                                                 
21 The equality of payoffs in both conditions was achieved by informing participants only about the sum of 
the payoff for the respective round, and not the single parts of this sum (kept amount of the initial endowment 
and amount received from the Public Good). 
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information of the contribution rates of IG and OG players and the measure for generalized 
social exclusion. All three measures of harm were significantly correlated: Monetary 
punishment and exclusion from future rounds: r = .672, p <.001; monetary punishment and 
generalized social exclusion: r = .349, p = .015; exclusion from future rounds and generalized 
social exclusion: r = 315, p = .029.  
Negative Emotions. The same measures as in the second study were used to measure 
negative moral emotions toward the OG and identification with the IG.  
Ingroup Identification. Participants´ identification with their IG, M = 5.11; SD = 1.28, was 
significantly higher than the centre of the scale, t(46) = 6.00, p < .001. There was neither in t1 
(F (1, 46) =.06, p = .808, minimal goal: M = 5.07; SD = 1.55; maximal goal: M = 5.16; SD = 
.90.) nor in t2 (F (1,46) = .003, p = .959, minimal goal: M = 5.29; SD = .99; maximal goal: M 
= 5.27; SD = 1.29.) a main effect of goal-type on the level of identification with the IG.  
4.3.5 Results22. 
Goal-Type and Infliction of Harm Participants in the minimal goal condition were more 
likely to punish members of the deviating OG more severely, F (1,46) = 4.34, p = .022, η2 = 
.09, more likely to exclude members of the OG from future rounds, F (1, 46) = 5.95, p = .010, 
η2 = .12, and more likely to exclude other members of this group from the participation in 
future profitable studies, F (1, 46) = 3.41, p = .035, η2 = .07, than participants in the maximal 
goal condition (Table 2).  
Goal-Type and Negative Emotions. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
independent between subjects factor of goal-type condition revealed a significant effect of 
goal-type on the combined scale of negative emotions towards the OG, F(1, 46) = 4.54, p = 
.020, η2 = .09. Participants in the minimal goal condition reported more negative emotions 
towards the OG than participants in the maximal goal condition (Table 2). 
  
                                                 
22 All analyses with the independent variable goal-type are one-tailed analyses in this chapter. 
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Table 2: The Effect of Goal-type on the Infliction of Harm and Negative Emotions toward a 
Deviant OG 
 Goal-type 
 Minimal Goal Maximal Goal 
Form of Harm M SD M SD 
Monetary Punishment 4.46 2.00 3.32 1.76 
Social Exclusion 4.54 2.34 3.05 1.81 
Generalized Social Exclusion 5.69 1.67 4.82 1.59 
Negative Emotions 3.37 2.10 2.24 1.45 
 
A series of regression analyses was performed to analyze whether moral emotions mediate 
the relation between the manipulated factor goal type (minimal versus maximal) and the 
infliction of harm on the OG (monetary punishment, social exclusion from future rounds and 
generalized social exclusion). First, goal type had a significant impact on negative moral 
emotions, β = -.30, p = .020, and on monetary punishment, β = -.29, p = .022. Negative moral 
emotions predicted the degree of punishment, β = .67, p < .001. When controlling for negative 
moral emotions, goal type had no longer a significant effect on monetary punishment, β = -
.10, p = .192. To test the indirect effect bootstrapping (N=2000) was used to determine the 
standard error (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008). The indirect effect of goal type on 
punishment via negative moral emotions was significant, BCa (95%) = [-1.4974, -.1289]. 
Goal type had a significant impact on the exclusion of OG members from future rounds, β 
= -.34, p = .010. Negative moral emotions predicted the exclusion of OG-members from 
future rounds, β = .57, p < .001. When controlling for negative moral emotions, goal type had 
no longer a significant effect on the exclusion of OG members from future rounds, β = -.18, p 
= .075. The indirect effect of goal type on the exclusion of OG members from future rounds 
via moral emotions was significant, BCa (95%) = [-1.4657, -.1229]. 
Goal type had a marginally significant effect on generalized social exclusion of OG 
members, β = -.26, p = .036. Negative moral emotions predicted the generalized social 
exclusion of OG-members, β = .66, p < .001. When controlling for negative moral emotions, 
goal-type had no longer a significant effect on the generalized social exclusion of OG 
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members, β = -.07, p = .351. The indirect effect of goal type on the generalized social 
exclusion of OG via moral emotions was significant, BCa (95%) = [-1.3117, -.1032]. 
4.3.6 Discussion 
This third study was a redesign of Study 2. Its first aim was to replicate the effect of goal-
type on the infliction of harm on members of the OG that was found in the first two studies 
while controlling experimentally for several factors that were confounded with the factor 
goal-type in the first two studies. In this third study the differences in payoffs participants 
missed out on because of the deviant OG in minimal and maximal goal condition were 
experimentally controlled for. Differences in payoffs from the two different types of Public 
Goods Game that were used to manipulate goal-type could therefore be ruled out as 
alternative explanations for the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on the OG. 
Secondly, the level of the superordinate goal in both minimal and maximal goal condition was 
selected by the participants themselves. The goal-selection was therefore identical in both 
minimal and maximal goal condition. The source of the superordinate goal could therefore be 
excluded as an alternative explanation for the main effect of goal-type on the infliction of 
harm on a deviating OG. 
The main hypothesis could be confirmed. Participants in the minimal goal condition were 
more likely to punish members of the OG thus replicating the effect of goal-type on monetary 
punishment of the OG that was found in the first two studies. They were in addition more 
likely to exclude members of the OG from the participation in future profitable rounds of the 
Public Good Game. A measure of generalized social exclusion showed that this effect was not 
restricted to the members of the OG that were committing the goal deviation but applied as 
well to members of the OG that did not commit any deviation, that were anonymous and not 
known by the participants. This effect is even more notable keeping in mind that the group 
identities were minimal and content-free. The effects of goal-type on various measures of 
harm inflicted on the OG were mediated by negative moral emotions towards the OG as in the 
second study. There was no main effect of goal-type on the level of identification, rendering 
the alternative process of a mediation of the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on 
the OG unlikely as an alternative explanation. 
It is however possible, that participants were more likely to inflict harm on members of 
the OG in the minimal goal condition because of their intuitive understanding of the 
respective Public Good Game. Participants had no knowledge of the exact amount the initial 
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endowment or the payoff stemming from the Public Good when answering the dependent 
variables. This way any possible influence of the payoff participants missed out on because of 
the OG was excluded as an alternative explanation of the effect of goal-type on harm inflicted 
on the OG (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Conceptual Differences between Step-Level and Graded Public Goods Game 
 
In the minimal goal condition there was no payoff from the Public Good (Figure 4: Payoff IG-
OG) as a consequence of the OG deviation. This might have appeared as a more severe 
consequence in comparison to the maximal goal condition. Participants in the maximal goal 
condition knew they would receive some payoff from the Public Good as a result of the 
contributions of the IG players (Figure 4: Payoff IG-OG). An additional study is therefore 
needed that excludes structural differences in the payoff matrices as an alternative explanation 
for the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on members of a deviant OG. 
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4.4 Study IV: Goal-type Framing  
4.4.1 Introduction 
It is possible that participants in the minimal goal condition in Study 3 were more likely to 
inflict harm on members of the OG because of their intuitive understanding of the step-level 
public Goods Game. The possibility remains that the effect of goal-type on the infliction of 
harm was caused by a perceptual difference between minimal and maximal goal condition, 
even though there were no differences in payoffs between goal-type conditions in Study 3. 
Participants in the maximal goal condition received - according to the rules of a graded Public 
Goods Game - at least some payoff from the Public Good despite the deviation of the players 
of the OG. Participants in the minimal goal condition received no payoff from the Public 
Good because of the OG deviation (Figure 4). The fact that there was no payoff from the 
Public Good in the minimal goal condition might have appeared as a more severe 
consequence of the OG deviation in comparison to the maximal goal condition where 
participants received at least some payoff from the Public Good. Therefore, a change in the 
goal-type manipulation is required that excludes the possible influence of structural 
differences in the payoff matrices as an alternative explanation for the effect of goal-type on 
the infliction of harm on the OG. 
4.4.2 Goal-type Manipulation 
The specific aim of this study is to disentangle the manipulation of goal-type and the 
payoff matrices of graded and step-level Public Goods Game and. Therefore, participants in 
both conditions play a graded Public Goods Game. Participants´ representations of the 
superordinate goal as minimal or maximal are manipulated by a mere framing. The instruction 
in which participants are asked to suggest a contribution level of the initial endowment as 
superordinate goal is either framed as a maximal “the-more-the-better”-goal or a “black-and-
white”-minimal goal. There are no functional implications of this framing. Goal-Type 
Manipulation Check. The assessment of participants´ goal-type representation showed that 
participants in the minimal goal condition scored significantly higher, M = 3.71; SD = .99, 
than participants in the maximal goal condition, M = 2.65; SD = .95, indicating a stronger 
minimal goal representation than participants in the maximal goal condition, F (1, 46) = 
13.94, p < .001, η2 = .24. 
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4.4.3 Group-goal Setting 
As in the previous study no explicit goal was given in either condition. Instead the same 
group-goal setting mechanism as in Study 3 was used in both minimal and maximal goal 
condition. Participants could choose an average contribution level of 40 %, 60 % or 80 % as 
superordinate goal. This superordinate goal had - as in Study 3 - no functional implication. 
Participants engaged in both conditions in a graded Public Goods Game. Contribution 
Decisions. Participants in the minimal goal condition contributed on average 63 % of their 
initial endowment, SD = 19.84, participants in the maximal goal condition 75 %, SD = 14.10. 
4.4.4 Methods 
Design and Participants. Forty-seven students from the University of Jena participated in 
this study. The mean age of the participants was 21.36 years (SD = 2.56, range: 18-29), 28 of 
them female and 29 male. Twenty-four participants were randomly assigned to the minimal 
goal condition, 23 to the maximal goal condition. 
Procedure. The basic experimental setup, the trial round, and the main round including 
the goal deviation of the OG were identical with the third study. The procedure differed only 
with regard to the number of average contribution levels that participants could choose from 
as superordinate goal. In this study only three contribution levels (40 %, 60 %, 80 %) were 
eligible. Payoff. Participants were not immediately informed about the exact amount of their 
payoff in order to exclude payoff feedback as a possible factor affecting participants´ replies 
to the dependent variables. Participants were informed at the very end of the study that their 
payoff from the second round was 2.10 €. The payoffs from both rounds summed up to 5.80 € 
.and were rounded to a final payoff for the participation in the study of 6 €. 
4.4.5 Dependent Measures 
Monetary Punishment. Social Exclusion. Ingroup Identification. Negative Emotions. The 
same measures of monetary punishment, social exclusion from future rounds, IG 
identification and negative emotions were used as in the previous studies. Both measures of 
harm, monetary punishment and social exclusion, were significantly correlated, r=.49, p = 
.001. 
Ingroup Identification. Participants´ identification was significantly above the centre of 
the 7-point scale, t(46) = 5.92, p < .001; M = 5.13; SD = 1.31. 
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4.4.6 Results23 
Goal-Type and Infliction of Harm. As in the first two studies participants in the minimal 
goal condition were more likely to punish members of the OG, F(1,46) = 5.42, p = .012, η2 = 
.11, minimal goal: M = 5.38; SD = 1.38; maximal goal: M = 4.35; SD = 1.64, and exclude 
them from future rounds, F(1, 46) = 5.04, p = .015, η2 = .10, minimal goal: M = 4.79; SD = 
1.79; maximal goal: M = 3.57; SD = 1.95.  
Goal-Type and Negative Emotions. Participants in the minimal goal condition were more 
likely to report higher levels of negative moral emotions toward the OG, F(1,46) = 4.38, p = 
.021, η2 = .09, minimal goal: M = 3.50; SD = 1.74; maximal goal: M = 2.52; SD = 1.44. 
A mediational analysis was carried out to examine the role of negative emotions as a 
mediator in the relationship between goal-type and monetary punishment of the OG. Goal 
type had a significant impact on negative emotions towards the OG, β = -.30, p = .021, and on 
monetary punishment of OG members, β = -.33, p = .012. Negative moral emotions were 
significantly related to monetary punishment of OG-members, β = .54, p < .001. When 
controlling for moral emotions, goal type had no longer a significant effect on the monetary 
punishment of OG-members, β = -.18, p = .084. In order to test the indirect effect 
bootstrapping (N=2000) was used to determine the standard error. The indirect effect of goal 
type monetary punishment of OG members by negative moral emotions was significant, BCa 
(95%) = [-1.1302, -.0730]. 
A second mediational analysis was carried out to examine the role of negative emotions as 
a mediator in the relationship between goal-type and the exclusion of OG members from 
future rounds. Goal type had a significant impact on the exclusion of OG members from 
future rounds, β = -.32, p = .015. Moral emotions predicted the exclusion of OG-members 
from future rounds, β = .58, p < .001. When controlling for moral emotions, goal type had no 
longer a significant effect on the exclusion of OG members from future rounds, β = -.16, p = 
.11. In order to test the indirect effect bootstrapping (N=2000) was used to determine the 
standard error. The indirect effect of goal type on the exclusion of OG members from future 
rounds via moral emotions was significant, BCa (95%) = [-1.3571, -.0270]. 
  
                                                 
23 All analyses with the independent variable goal-type are one-tailed analyses in this chapter. 
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4.4.7 Discussion 
The main aim of this fourth study was a test of the goal-type hypothesis using a mere 
framing of the superordinate goal as minimal or maximal as a manipulation of goal-type. The 
independent variable goal-type - participants´ representation of the superordinate goal of 
contributing to a Public Good as either minimal or maximal - had been confounded with two 
specific payoff matrices in all previous studies. A graded Public Goods Game had been used 
to manipulate participants´ representation of the superordinate goal as maximal. A step-level 
Public Good Game had been used to manipulate participants´ representation of the 
superordinate goal as minimal. Study 3 had already controlled experimentally for payoff 
differences between minimal and maximal goal-type condition. However, a structural 
difference between step-level Public Goods Game (minimal goal condition) and graded Public 
Goods Game (Maximal goal condition) had remained in Study 3 as players did not receive 
any payoff from the Public Good in the minimal goal condition. It is possible that this lead to 
a perception of the OG deviation as more severe, resulting in a higher level of harm inflicted 
on the OG in the minimal goal condition. 
Study 4 was designed to rule this structural difference between minimal and maximal 
condition out as an alternative explanation for effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on 
members of a deviant OG: All participants engaged in Study 4 in a graded Public Goods 
Game - regardless of goal-type condition. Participants´ representation of the superordinate 
goal of making money by contributing to the Public Good as either minimal or maximal was 
manipulated with a mere framing of the group goal. An effect of goal-type on the infliction of 
harm of the deviant OG was found as in the previous studies. Participants in the minimal goal 
condition were more likely to inflict more harm on members of a deviant OG than participants 
in the maximal goal condition. This replication of the effect of goal-type on the infliction of 
harm allows the exclusion of a structural difference between payoff matrices of step-level 
Public Good Game and graded Public Good Game as an alternative explanation for the effect 
of goal-type on the infliction of harm on a deviant OG. The effect of goal-type on the 
infliction of harm on members of a deviant OG was - as in the previous two studies - 
mediated by negative emotions toward the OG. 
4.4.8 Summary of Studies 2, 3 and 4 
Studies 2, 3 and 4 showed that participants are more likely to inflict more severe harm on 
members of an OG deviating from a superordinate goal that is represented as a minimal goal 
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compared to the deviation from a superordinate goal that is represented as a maximal goal. 
Participants with a minimal representation of the superordinate goal showed also a higher 
level of negative emotions towards the OG. The effect of goal-type on punishment and 
exclusion of members of the OG was mediated by negative emotions toward the OG across 
Studies 2, 3, and 4. The incremental changes in the experimental design over these studies 
were supposed to rule out uncontrolled factors as explanations of the main effect of goal-type 
on the infliction of harm on the OG. Examples for these incremental changes in the 
experimental design are the selection of the level of the superordinate goal (Study 2 vs. Study 
3) or the manipulation of goal-type by means of different payoff matrices (Study 3 vs. Study 
4). A summarizing analysis across these three studies might show if the effects observed in all 




Figure 5: Goal-Type and Monetary Punishment: Studies 2 - 4 
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Figure 6: Goal-Type and Social Exclusion: Studies 3 and 4 
 
Figure 7: Goal-Type and Negative Emotions towards the OG: Studies 2 - 4 
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A MANOVA with the factors study and goal-type as independent variables and the 
dependent variables exclusion of the OG, punishment of the OG and negative emotions 
towards the OG was conducted. There were no interaction effects of study and goal-type24, 
neither for the dependent variable monetary punishment, F (1,154) = .04, p < .959, nor for the 
dependent variable social exclusion from future rounds, F (1,154) = .94, p = .393. 
A second MANOVA25 with the independent variable goal-type showed across all three 
studies that participants with a minimal goal representation showed significantly more 
negative moral emotions towards the OG, F (1,154) = 13.24, p < .001, η2 = .08, minimal goal: 
M = 3.56; SD = 1.78; maximal goal: M = 2.60; SD = 1.48, were more likely to exclude the OG 
from future rounds, F (1,153) = 9.58, p = .001, η2 = .06, minimal goal: M = 4.50 SD = 2.08; 
maximal goal: M = 3.49; SD = 1.97, and punish them monetarily, F (1,154) = 14.31, p < .001, 
η2 =.09, minimal goal: M = 4.76 ; SD = 1.88; maximal goal: M = 3.63; SD = 1.85. The two 
behavioral measures exclusion from future rounds a monetary punishment were significantly 
correlated, β = .575, p < .001.  
 
Figure 8: The Effect of Goal-type on the Infliction of Harm on the OG Mediated by Negative 
Moral Emotions towards the OG 
 
                                                 
24 The factor study however did have a significant effect on the dependent variable monetary punishment, F 
(1,153) = 4.021, p = .010, η2 = .05, one-tailed analysis,, due to a higher level of monetary punishment in both, 
minimal and maximal goal-type condition in Study 4. 
25 One-tailed analysis. 
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Two meditational analyses were carried out to examine the role of negative emotions as a 
mediator in the relationship between goal-type and the infliction of harm on the OG. In order 
to test the indirect effect bootstrapping (N=2000) was used to determine the standard error. 
The indirect effect of goal type on monetary punishment of OG members was significant, 
BCa (95%) = [-.9260,-.2388]. A second mediational analysis was carried out to examine the 
role of negative emotions as a mediator in the relationship between goal-type and exclusion 
from future rounds. The indirect effect of goal-type on the exclusion of OG members from 
future rounds was mediated by negative emotions towards the OG was BCa (95%) = [-
1.0317,-.2970]. These analyses confirm the consistency of the mediation of the effect of goal-
type on the infliction of harm by negative emotions toward the OG across the various studies. 
 
Table 3: Table of Significant Effects of Goal-type on the Infliction of Harm Depending on 
Form of Goal-type Manipulation and Form of Harm 
  



















Study 4 Study 4 Study 5 
 
 
This summarizing analysis shows a great deal of consistency across the last three studies. 
However, one minor drawback remains. Study 4 did not test an effect of goal-type on 
generalized social exclusion. Such a test of the effect of goal-type on generalized social 
exclusion would complete the permutation of goal-type manipulations and different forms of 
harm inflicted on the deviant OG (Table 3). This test of the effect of goal-type on the 
infliction of harm using at the same time the most subtle goal-type manipulation and the most 
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extensive measure of harm would conclude the test of both theoretical hypotheses and 
experimental paradigm. It is therefore the aim of a fifth study to show the effect of goal-type 
on the infliction of harm in form of generalized social exclusion using the framing technique 
presented in Study 4 to manipulate participants´ representations of the superordinate goal as 
either minimal or maximal.
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4.5 Study V: Generalized Social Exclusion 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this fifth study is to replicate the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm 
on a deviant OG that has already been found in the previous studies. The specific concern of 
this study is to manipulate goal-type with the framing technique that was already used in 
Study 4 and show the effect of goal-type for the specific case of generalized social exclusion. 
The subtle framing technique as goal-type manipulation in combination with the far-reaching 
infliction of harm on uninvolved members of the OG would complete the test of both 
experimental design and the goal-type hypothesis (Table 3). The same goal-setting technique 
was used as in Studies 3 and 4. The goal-type manipulation based on a framing of the group 
goal as either minimal or maximal and was identical to the goal-type manipulation used in 
Study 4.  
4.5.2 Methods 
Participants. Forty-seven students from the University of Jena participated in this study. 
Twenty-eight participants were female, 19 male. The mean age was 21.53 years, SD = 2.48, 
range: 18-31. 
Procedure. The procedure of this study was identical to the procedure used in study 4. 
Payoff main round. Participants´ payoffs were kept constant across conditions and goal-levels 
as in Study 4. All participants received 3.80 € as payoff from the first round and 2,10 € from 
the second round. The total payoff of 5.90 € was rounded to 6 €.  
4.5.3 Measures 
Generalized Social Exclusion. The general concept of the item of generalized social 
exclusion was similar to the measure used in Study 3. It was assessed after the actual 
computer-based study as a separate study in a pen-and-paper format. Participants were told a 
cover-story that explained why they had to select a number of participants from previous 
studies that were not invited to participate in a future study. One improvement of this measure 
of generalized social exclusion over the one used in Study 3 was that this measure was 
formulated as an exclusion of individuals from future studies, and not as a non-inclusion26. It 
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is important to point out that there was no given number participants had to exclude. In 
addition there was no maximum number of individuals that could be excluded, resulting in 
inter-individual variance in the number of excluded individuals. 
Ingroup Identification. Participants´ identification with their IG was measured using the 
same items as in the previous studies. Participants´ identification with their IG, t1: M = 4.98; 
SD = 1.51 and t2: M = 5.25; SD = 1.43, was both in t1 and t2 significantly higher than the 
centre of the scale, t1: t(46) = 4.45, p < .001 and t2: t(46) = 6.00, p < .001. There was neither in 
t1, β = -.022, p = .882, nor in t2, β = -.060, p = .687, a main effect of goal-type on the level of 
identification with the IG. Goal-type Manipulation Check. Three items assessed on a seven-
point scale participants´ representation of the goal-type, e.g. “The average contribution level 
of […] must be achieved”; “The average contribution level of […] should ideally be 
achieved”; Cronbachs α = .67. The items were adjusted to the contribution level participants 
had chosen previously. Participants in the minimal goal condition scored significantly higher 
on the goal-type manipulation check, F(1, 46) = 15.06, p < .001, η2 = .25, indicating a 
stronger minimal goal representation than participants in the maximal goal condition, minimal 
goal: M = 4.91; SD = 1.33; maximal goal: M = 3.33; SD = 1.45. Contribution Decisions. 
Participants in the minimal goal condition contributed on average 79 %, SD = 16.5. 
Participants in the maximal goal condition contributed on average 68 %, SD = 18.6. The set 
group goal for the average contribution level and participants actual contribution decisions 
were significantly correlated, both in t1, r = .72, p < .001, and t2, r = .58, p < .001. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
26 The cover story was that participants of former studies that had applied to participate in a future well paid 
study had to be selected from a database. Not all participants from that database could participate. Participants of 
this study therefore had to select participants from the database that would not be invited to participate in the 
future study. Participants in the present study as uninvolved participants were asked to select a number of players 
that could not be invited to the future study in order to achieve an unbiased selection process. Former 
participants were listed symbolized by a code of letters and numbers. Although participants of the alleged earlier 
studies were kept anonymous on the list, their group-identity as either members of the beta- or gamma-group 
was evident. The code of 10 participants from the database contained the letters “be” - indicating a beta-group 
membership - and the code of 10 participants contained the letters “ga” indicating a gamma-group membership.  
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4.5.4 Results 
Goal-type and Generalized Social Exclusion. Participants in the minimal goal condition 
were not more likely to exclude uninvolved participants in general - regardless of their group 
membership -from the participation in future profitable studies, F(1, 46) = 0.01, p = .908, 
minimal goal condition: M = 7.12; SD = 2.88; maximal goal condition: M = 7.23; SD = 3.44. 
Participants in the minimal goal condition were not significantly more likely to exclude 
members of the OG from the participation in future profitable studies, F (1, 46) = 1.37, p = 
.248, minimal goal condition: M = 4.16; SD = 2.21; maximal goal condition: M = 3.41; SD = 
2.18.  
If however the number of excluded OG members is set into relation to the absolute 
number of excluded participants - thus controlling for the inter-individual variance in the 
number of excluded individuals - a difference between minimal and maximal goal condition 
becomes evident. Participants in the minimal goal condition were more likely to exclude more 
OG members than IG members from the participation in future profitable, F (1, 46) = 4.58, p 
= .019, η2 = .0927, share of excluded OG members in the minimal goal condition: M = 62 %; 
SD = 26; share of excluded OG members in the maximal goal condition: M = 47 %; SD = .22. 
The relation between excluded OG members and excluded IG members deviated only in the 
minimal goal condition from an exclusion by chance of 50 % excluded OG-members and 50 
% OG-members, minimal goal condition t(24) = 2.23, p = .018, maximal goal condition t(21) 
= -.74, p = .233. 
4.5.5 Discussion 
It was the aim of the study not only to replicate the effect of goal-type on the infliction of 
harm on a deviant OG. But to do so using a mere framing as goal-type manipulation and to 
show the effect of goal-type on generalized social exclusion as a specific form of harm 
inflicted on members of the OG. . One improvement of the measure of generalized social 
exclusion in this study - in contrast to Study 3 - was that it was explicitly phrased as an 
exclusion item.  
There was no effect of goal-type on the general tendency to exclude participants 
regardless of their group membership. Similarly participants in the minimal goal condition 
were not more likely to exclude OG members in general from future profitable studies. This 
lack of difference between participants in minimal and maximal goal condition however can 
                                                 
27 One-tailed analysis 
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be explained by a methodological feature of the measure for generalized social exclusion in 
this study. The measure of generalized social exclusion used in this study was not based on a 
quantitatively specified scale. Participants could choose how many participants from former 
studies they wanted to exclude from the participation in highly profitable future studies. A 
second analysis controlled for any inter-individual differences in terms of the absolute number 
of participants excluded from the future study by analyzing the quotient of excluded OG 
members and the total number of excluded participants. This analysis reveals a different 
picture. Participants in the maximal goal condition made no difference between excluding IG 
and OG members. They excluded members of both groups with the same probability. 
Participants in the minimal goal condition however deviated in their exclusion decisions 
significantly from chance. Participants in the minimal goal condition were significantly more 
likely to exclude members of the OG than members of the IG. This result is clearly in line 
with the results of the previous studies. 
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5 General Discussion 
5.1 Summary 
The present research set out to pursue two central research goals. The first goal was a test 
of the goal-type hypothesis. It was hypothesized that the deviation from a minimal 
superordinate goal would lead, because of its dichotomous structure, to a higher level of harm 
inflicted on members of a deviant OG than the deviation from a maximal, graded 
superordinate goal (goal-type hypothesis). A second additional hypothesis had been derived. It 
was hypothesized that this effect of the goal-type of a superordinate goal on the infliction of 
harm on members of a deviant OG would be mediated by negative moral emotions towards 
the deviant OG (negative emotions hypothesis). All studies were set in a specifically designed 
experimental paradigm based on Public Goods Games. It was the second main goal of the 
present research to develop this experimental paradigm in order to test these hypotheses. 
There were two main requirements for this experimental paradigm. First, it was supposed to 
allow the measurement of harm on members of a deviant OG in the form of actual behavior. 
The second main requirement for the research paradigm was a strictly experimental design in 
order to exclude external factors as alternative explanations for an effect of goal-type on the 
infliction of harm on members of a deviant OG. 
Five studies were conducted to test the two main hypotheses. Both hypotheses could be 
confirmed. Participants with a minimal goal-type representation of a superordinate goal were 
more likely to inflict more harm on members of an OG deviating from this superordinate goal 
than participants with a maximal goal-type representation. This effect was independent of the 
way goal-type was manipulated and was found for three different measures of harm including 
a measure of generalized social exclusion. This effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm 
on members of a deviant OG was mediated by negative moral emotions toward the OG. This 
mediation was found independent of the way goal-type was manipulated and for all measures 
of harm. The following chapters will discuss the evolution of the experimental paradigm 
across studies, set the results of these studies in a broader context and discuss future research 
directions. 
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5.1.1 Goal-setting Procedure 
The superordinate goal of making money by contributing collectively to a Public Goods 
Game was identical across all studies. However, two different procedures were used to 
introduce this superordinate goal. In the first two studies players received no information 
about their co-players except for their membership in one of the arbitrary group categories. 
Participants had no information if the goal of contributing to the Public Goods Game was 
shared by their co-players previous to their own contribution decision. However, trust in 
other-players behavior is crucial for cooperation in a Public Goods Game to occur. Therefore 
a test-round was introduced in all Studies from Study 3 on to communicate that the 
superordinate goal of contributing to the Public Goods Game was a shared goal among IG 
members. This first round established in addition not only that the superordinate goal was 
known to all IG members, but that the other IG members would also behave in line with this 
goal and contribute a share of their initial endowment to the Public Good. This introduction of 
the superordinate was identical for all players regardless of goal-type condition (minimal or 
maximal superordinate goal). 
5.1.2 Goal-type Manipulation 
Two different manipulations of participants´ representation of the superordinate goal as 
either minimal or maximal were used. A first goal-type manipulation was based on slightly 
different designs of a Public Good Game (Studies 1 - 3). A Graded Public Goods Game was 
used to resemble the graded structure of a maximal superordinate goal. The superordinate 
goal consisted in this maximal goal condition in an ideal average contribution rate of 100 % 
the initial endowment resulting in a maximum payoff on a collective level. A step-level Public 
Goods Game was used to resemble the dichotomous “black/white” structure of a minimal 
goal. A threshold of an average contribution level had to be reached in order to receive a 
payoff from the Public Good. However, this manipulation of goal-type was potentially 
flawed. Participants received - as a consequence of the OG´s deviation - a slightly lower 
payoff from the step-level Public Goods Game (minimal goal condition) than from the graded 
Public Goods Game (maximal goal condition). Study 3 controlled experimentally for this 
difference in payoffs. However, the structural differences between step-level Public Goods 
Game and graded Public Goods Game remained. In the maximal goal condition players 
received at least some payoff from the Public Good. In the minimal goal condition 
participants received no payment at all from the Public Good. This might have lead to a 
perception of the OG´s deviation as more severe, even though there were no differences in 
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final payoffs. Therefore, a second manipulation of goal-type was based on a mere framing 
(Studies 4 - 7). All players engaged in a graded Public Goods Game. The superordinate goal 
was either framed as a graded “shades-of-grey”-goal or a minimal “black-or-white”-goal.  
5.1.3 Goal-type and the Infliction of Harm 
The infliction of harm was measured on a variety of measures, ranging from the deduction 
of money from the OG, to the exclusion of members of the OG from future rounds of the 
Public Goods Game and the generalized social exclusion of uninvolved members of the OG 
from the participation in future profitable studies. The goal-type hypothesis was tested using 
both kinds of goal-type manipulation for all dependent measures of harm. Participants were 
more likely to inflict more harm on members of an OG deviating from a minimal 
superordinate goal than members of an OG deviating from a maximal superordinate goal in 
all studies. The effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on a deviant OG was replicated 
various times across both goal-type manipulations and for various measures of harm. The 
effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on a deviant OG was independent of the kind of 
goal-type manipulation. 
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5.1.4 Outgroup Goal-deviation 
It was the aim of the present research to scrutinize the impact of a representation of a 
superordinate goal as either minimal or maximal on the infliction of harm on members of a 
deviant OG. Therefore a clear manipulation of the OG´s deviation was designed in the 
framework of the experimental design. The OG ´s deviation from the superordinate goal of 
making money by contributing to a Public Goods Game consisted in a contributing 
significantly below the level of a superordinate goal and less than the members of the 
participants´ IG. All members of the OG contributed less than the members of the IG. This 
pattern of the OG´s deviation from the superordinate goal was chosen deliberately to create an 
unambiguous case of OG deviation. The contribution decisions of both IG members and OG 
members were staged in order to keep the OG-deviation pattern identical for all participants. 
However, this clear-cut manipulation of the OG´s deviation from the superordinate goal has a 
theoretical drawback as only deviant OG-members of the OG were punished respectively 
excluded.  But the great destructive potential of the infliction of harm in an intergroup context 
originates in particular from the generalized infliction of harm on uninvolved members of the 
OG. Future research should therefore address the infliction of harm on uninvolved group 
members by disentangling the deviation of OG members and the infliction of harm on 
members of this OG. One such OG-deviation pattern in the framework of the present 
experimental paradigm could be the partial deviation of the OG (2 of a total 3 OG members 
deviating significantly from the superordinate goal, 1 OG member behaving in line with the 
superordinate goal). The aim of this heterogeneous OG deviation pattern would be to show 
the infliction of harm even on members of the OG that are not deviating from the OG. 
However, the present research started already to address this concern by assessing the effect 
of goal-type on the generalized exclusion of uninvolved OG members. 
5.2 Generalization 
Study 3 measured participants´ inclination to exclude uninvolved members of IG and OG 
from the participation in future profitable studies. This effect of goal-type on generalized 
social exclusion is different from the two other measures of harm. Both monetary punishment 
and exclusion from future rounds were directed at the very individuals deviating from the 
superordinate goal of contributing at a certain level to a Public Goods Game. The members 
that were excluded from the participation in future profitable studies via generalized social 
exclusion however had not deviated from this superordinate goal. Their only connection to the 
deviant members of the OG was their abstract, arbitrary OG membership. It is important to 
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point out that participants had in none of these 3 studies an opportunity to profit from their 
exclusion decision as they themselves had no possibility to participate in these future 
profitable studies. Participants were more likely to include IG members instead of OG 
members to participate in these future studies. Study 5 similarly assessed participants´ 
tendency to exclude uninvolved IG and OG members from future studies using a mere 
framing manipulation of goal-type. Participants in minimal and maximal goal condition did 
not differ in the absolute number of excluded IG and OG members. But only participants in 
the minimal goal condition deviated from a fairness strategy when excluding uninvolved IG 
and OG members. Participants in the maximal goal condition were equally likely to exclude 
IG and OG members. Only participants in the minimal goal condition were significantly more 
likely to exclude uninvolved OG members from the participation in future studies. But why 
were participants with a minimal goal representation of a superordinate goal more likely than 
participants with a maximal goal representation to inflict harm on uninvolved members of the 
deviant OG? The following paragraphs present 3 distinct attempts to explain this particular 
effect of goal.-type on the generalized exclusion of OG members. 
5.2.1 Generalization and Experimental Paradigm 
The effect of goal-type on the generalized exclusion of harm could be based on the same 
process as the effect of goal-type on monetary punishment and the exclusion of OG member 
from future rounds of the Public Goods Game. The measure of generalized social exclusion 
was significantly correlated with these two more direct measures of harm in Study 2. The 
effect of goal-type on generalized social exclusion was in addition mediated by negative 
moral emotions toward the OG, just as the effect of goal-type on the two other measures of 
harm. However, the measure of generalized social exclusion differs decisively from the two 
other measures of harm in terms of its effect of members of the OG that were merely 
connected to the small subgroup of OG deviants by an arbitrary and trivial group membership. 
The argument that the effect of goal-type on generalized social exclusion was based on the 
same process as the effect of goal-type on monetary punishment and social exclusion from 
future rounds would imply that a strong generalization process from OG sample (the 3 deviant 
OG members in the Public Goods Game) to OG population (all OG members) was present in 
both minimal and maximal goal condition. 
Research on the generalization of sample information in intergroup contexts has reported 
that sample information that is favourable from an IG perspective is directly generalized to 
the target population reflecting the sample distribution (Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995). 
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However, sample information that is unfavorable from an IG perspective is not always 
generalized directly to the target population. Instead identity protection strategies are used 
such as a disproportionate generalization from small or heterogeneous samples. If the sample 
does not allow such a biased generalization other strategies are used to protect a positive 
social identity. In the case of a homogeneous or large sample the - from an IG perspective - 
unfavourable sample information might be generalized to the target population. However, in 
this case individuals might perceive the population as more variable in order to protect their 
social identity. In the present research the sample information was represented by 
participants´ contribution decisions in the Public Goods Game. The valence of this sample 
information was given by the superordinate goal of making money by reaching a certain 
average contribution level. The samples were small as only 3 IG members and 3 OG members 
engaged in the Public Goods Game. The sample information was homogeneous. The OG 
contributed in all studies significantly below the average contribution level of the 
superordinate goal and at the same time significantly below the contribution level of the IG. 
The sample information of the IG and OG was also distinct as contribution patterns of IG and 
OG never overlapped (the lowest contributing IG member always contributed more than the 
highest contributing OG member). The sample information was therefore favorable from an 
IG perspective not necessitating one of the described identity protection strategies. It is 
therefore highly likely that the sample distribution was generalized to the population level: All 
OG members deviated significantly from the superordinate goal. At the same time all IG 
members were contributing in line with this superordinate goal. Thus, it can be expected that 
OG members at a population level - all existing OG members regardless if they participated in 
the study - were considered to be equally deviant as the sample group of OG members. 
This generalization tendency might have been further amplified by the experimental 
context. The intergroup context of the present research is based on the Minimal Group 
Paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). Participants had no possibility for face-to-face interaction or 
communication. All participants remained anonymous. The group categories were arbitrary 
and abstract. There was no interaction history with members of the OG prior to the 
experiment. The OG´s deviation from the superordinate goal was the only sample of 
information that could be attributed to a membership in the OG. This experimental control of 
sources of individuating information is highly likely to increase the homogeneity perceptions 
of an OG (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). Both the quality of the sample information as well as 
the specific design of the experimental paradigm favored therefore the generalization of the 
sample information - the OG´s deviation from the superordinate goal - to the population level 
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of all OG members. Thus suggesting that all OG members are deviants from the superordinate 
goal, justifying their punishment regardless if they had actually committed such a deviation or 
not. 
This first attempt to explain the effect of goal-type on the generalized social exclusion of 
uninvolved OG members assumes in other words a very high level of generalization from OG 
information sample to OG population level in both minimal and maximal goal condition. The 
effect of goal-type on all 3 measures of harm would - according to this rationale - be based on 
the same processes. However, this approach cannot explain the result of Study 5 that only 
participants in the minimal goal condition deviated in their infliction of generalized social 
exclusion on IG and OG members from a fairness strategy. Two additional explanation 
attempts suggest in contrast a distinct effect of goal-type on the generalization process 
compared to the two direct, “retributive” measures of harm monetary punishment and 
exclusion from future rounds. Both approaches are based on the observation that the 
generalization process is likely to be closely related to perceptions of OG homogeneity. The 
higher the perceived homogeneity of the OG with regard to a trait - such as the deviance from 
the superordinate goal - the stronger the generalization of OG sample information to an OG 
population level. Both alternative explanation attempts for the effect of goal-type on the 
generalized exclusion of uninvolved OG members assume therefore an effect of goal-type on 
the perception of OG homogeneity. Both approaches suggest that a minimal goal 
representation leads to a higher level of perceived OG homogeneity than a maximal goal 
representation. 
5.2.2 Goal-type, Threat and Generalization 
The deviation of an OG from a minimal superordinate goal is expected to be perceived as 
more severe and negative than the same deviation from a maximal superordinate goal. 
Research by Henderson-King and Nisbett demonstrated that the generalization from 
individual OG-members to the population level of the OG is particularly likely to occur for 
negative, stereotypical information (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996). Similarly research in 
the framework of the Group Attribution Error paradigm could show that participants inferred 
more homogeneous attitudes among members of threatening compared to non-threatening 
groups (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, Buidin, 2001). This line of reasoning would suggest that 
an OG´s deviation from a minimal superordinate goal is more likely to be perceived as 
negative and threatening compared to an OG´s deviation from a maximal superordinate goal. 
A more negative evaluation and a higher level of perceived threat should in turn lead to a 
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higher level of perceived OG homogeneity and a stronger generalization from an OG sample 
distribution to the level of the OG population. 
5.2.3 Goal-type as a Mindset and Generalization 
An alternative explanation for the effect of goal-type on generalized social exclusion that 
is also based on an effect of goal-type on perceived OG homogeneity follows a rather 
cognitive rationale. Previous research has conceived the concept of goal-type beyond the 
representation of a superordinate goal as a mindset (Berthold et al., 2011). Mindsets are 
considered as cognitive procedures related to how one chooses between various alternatives 
(see Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). This concept of 
goal-type as a mindset suggests a further reaching effect of goal-type with the potential to 
affect the perception of the OG´s homogeneity in particular (e.g. Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). 
A minimal goal mindset with its dichotomous structure may lead to a higher level of 
perceived OG homogeneity than a graded maximal goal mindset, which allows a more 
differentiated perspective on the OG. This higher level of perceived OG homogeneity should 
in turn lead to a more pronounced generalization of sample information regarding the OG 
such as the deviation from a superordinate goal of some OG members to an OG population 
level. This line of reasoning suggests that the effect of goal-type on the generalized social 
exclusion of uninvolved OG-members is mediated by different levels of perceived OG 
homogeneity, independently of the perceived level of threat. Participants with a minimal 
“black-and-white”- mindset are expected to perceive the OG as more homogeneous than 
participants with a maximal “shades-of-grey”- mindset. A perception of the OG as more 
homogeneous should facilitate the generalized infliction of harm on uninvolved OG-members. 
Again, the level of perceived OG homogeneity is expected to be strongly related to the extent 
of generalized social exclusion of uninvolved OG members. 
Further research is required to substantiate the presumption that the effect of goal-type is 
based on a specific effect of goal-type on the generalization of OG sample information to an 
OG population level. Future studies should therefore test the assumed effect of goal-type on 
the perception of OG homogeneity. The OG sample information in the present research was 
very homogeneous (very similar OG contribution decisions, high distinctiveness from IG 
contribution decisions, suppression of individuating information). More heterogeneous OG 
sample information should avoid a constantly high level of generalization across goal-type 
conditions and allow a better test of a possible effect of goal-type on the perceived OG 
homogeneity. In addition OG homogeneity could be measured twice, once right after the goal-
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type manipulation (t1) and once after the deviation of the OG from the superordinate goal (t2) 
in order to determine if a possible effect of goal-type on the perceived homogeneity of the OG 
is based on different levels of OG threat in minimal and maximal goal condition. An effect of 
goal-type on perceived OG homogeneity in t1 would support the rationale based on different 
mindsets in minimal and maximal goal condition. An effect of goal-type on perceived OG 
homogeneity in t2 but not in t1 would favor in contrast an explanation based on different levels 
of perceived threat depending on goal-type of the superordinate goal. 
5.3 Negative Moral Emotions 
The “negative emotions” hypothesis suggested that participants report different levels of 
negative emotions in response to the OG´s deviation from a superordinate goal depending on 
the representation of this superordinate goal as either minimal or maximal. This hypothesis 
could be confirmed. Participants in the minimal goal condition were more likely to report 
more negative moral emotions toward the OG than participants in the maximal goal condition 
in Studies 2, 3, and 4. Negative moral emotions mediated the effect of goal-type on the 
infliction of harm on members of a deviant OG in Studies 2, 3, and 4. The “negative 
emotions” hypothesis addresses the effect of goal-type on negative moral emotions toward the 
OG on a quantitative dimension. Negative emotions were measured in Studies 2, 3 and 4 by 
three items, each addressing one specific emotional reaction toward the OG (anger, contempt 
and disgust). These three items were significantly correlated in all studies. They were 
therefore consolidated into one combined construct of negative moral emotions. 
But various approaches to moral emotions have highlighted the importance of a 
qualitative differentiation between various distinct types of moral domains. Rozin and co-
authors suggested in their CAD Triad Hypothesis that three basic negative other-regarding 
emotions - contempt, anger and disgust - are elicited by violations of three basic moral codes - 
community, autonomy and disgust (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). This CAD-Triad 
Hypothesis links contempt to the moral code of community, anger to the moral code of 
autonomy and disgust to the moral code of divinity. The CAD Triad-Hypothesis suggests a 
qualitative fit between different moral domains and matching emotional responses of 
deviations in this respective moral domain. The superordinate goal of collectively 
contributing to a Public Good may best be categorized as belonging to the moral code of 
autonomy as it was based on a contribution level that players selected themselves. This 
superordinate goal of contributing to a Public Good lacked in addition any features that would 
have been typical for the moral codes of community or divinity such as hierarchical structure 
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or a relation to the abstract concept of purity. Participants´ emotional response to the OG´s 
deviation was measured in studies 2, 3, and 4 - as described earlier - on three items, each 
targeting anger, contempt or disgust. These three items were significantly correlated with each 
other, forming a homogenous scale. But the three emotional items differed consistently with 
regard to the level of their means. Participants were inclined to report much higher levels of 
anger than contempt or even disgust. This pattern might therefore be interpreted as a fit 
between the moral code of the superordinate goal of contributing in a Public Goods Game and 
anger as the most appropriate emotional reaction to a deviation from this superordinate goal. 
However, this assumption is at the given point purely speculative. But it opens up a new 
interesting perspective on the role of negative moral emotions in the relation between the 
goal-type of a superordinate goal and the infliction harm on deviants from this goal. It raises 
the questions if the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on deviants is mediated by 
specific moral emotions depending on the specific moral code of the superordinate goal. 
Examples: 
The present research suggests that the effect of goal-type on the extent of harm inflicted 
on members of a deviant OG is mediated primarily by anger if the deviation from the 
superordinate goal is mainly perceived as a frustration or blockage of the group´s goal as it 
may be the case in the present research. But it might be presumed that the effect of goal-type 
on the infliction of harm is rather mediated by contempt if the superordinate goal is rooted in 
the moral code of community, that is characterized by authority and respect (e.g. in a highly 
stratified and hierarchical context such as the military. The deviation from an order by a group 
with lower status may result in various degrees of punishment depending on the 
representation of the order as minimal or maximal. The primary emotional reaction mediating 
this effect ought to be contempt). The effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on a 
deviant OG in a context rooted in the moral code of divinity and purity should result in yet 
another primary emotional reaction, moral disgust (e.g. the Catholic Church has a strict policy 
against abortion. A group of Catholics may support the practice of abortion in their commune 
under certain circumstances, for example if the pregnancy is a result of rape. Other Catholics 
may object this practice and demand punishment and possibly the exclusion of this deviant 
OG from the SOG, the Catholic Church. The severity of this punishment is expected to 
depend on their representation of the superordinate goal of protecting all life, born or unborn, 
as either minimal or maximal. It may be assumed that the predominant emotion mediating this 
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effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm is moral disgust, because the superordinate goal is 
set in the moral code of divinity). 
The CAD Triad Hypothesis suggests in sum that the effect of goal-type on the infliction of 
harm is mediated by contextually specific moral emotions. However, a different approach 
argues that specific negative emotions are related to particular social functions. Fischer and 
Roseman proposed that for example anger is prototypically related to short-term attacks but 
aims from a long-term perspective at potential reconciliation (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; 
Fischer & Roseman, 2007). The social function of anger is to alter another person´s 
undesirable behavior with the use of aggression, but to do so in order to improve the entire 
relation in a long-term perspective. Contempt on the other hand is related to short-term 
derogation, but also to long-term social distancing. It has been argued similarly that moral 
disgust - disgust elicited by social transgressions such as lying, cheating and stealing opposed 
to forms of pathogen disgust or sexual disgust - is also related to the social exclusion of 
deviants (Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). Moral disgust is - from a social 
functional perspective - targeted at the prevention of norm deviating behavior that threatens to 
inflict direct cost via defection or an indirect cost by disrupting cooperation in a group and the 
group´s cohesion (Cotrell & Neuberg, 2005).  
It may be suggested accordingly that minimal and maximal superordinate goals serve 
different social functions at a group level, regardless of the moral code of this superordinate 
goal. Maximal superordinate goals are characterized by graded evaluations in relation to an 
ideal that group members should strive for. It is therefore suggested that the social function of 
a maximal group goal is to define the prototype of a social category. Minimal superordinate 
goals on the contrary are defined by a dichotomous evaluation structure. A minimal goal is 
either fully achieved or not at all. It is therefore suggested that the social function of a 
minimal group goal is to define the borders of a social category. The deviation from a 
maximal superordinate goal activates a social relational goal of incentivizing the deviants to 
adhere more closely to this maximal goal. The behavioral reactions toward the deviants ought 
to reflect this social relational goal (example: If the superordinate goal of striking is 
represented as a maximal goal, deviants - workers who do not strike - may be faced with 
relatively mild forms of punishment in reaction to their deviance such as a fee by their union 
or name calling and appeals by their colleagues to join the strike). The primary emotional 
reaction in response to a deviation from a maximal goal should be anger. The deviation from a 
minimal superordinate goal activates in contrast a distinct social relational function that is 
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characterized by social distancing. The corresponding form of harm toward the deviants 
would be the cognitive and behavioral exclusion from the superordinate group (example: If 
the superordinate goal of striking is represented as a minimal goal, deviants may be no longer 
considered as part of the superordinate group “workers” by their striking co-workers. They 
may be faced with ostracism - co-workers refusing to work with them - and even physical 
violence and exclusion). Participants should not only report anger in response to a deviation 
from a minimal superordinate goal, but also contempt and moral disgust. 
The effect of the goal-type of a superordinate goal on the infliction of harm could be 
interpreted in support of these assumptions about the social functions of minimal and maximal 
group goals. Participants with a minimal goal representation of a superordinate goal were not 
only more inclined than participants with a maximal goal representation to punish deviants, to 
exclude them from future interactions or to exclude uninvolved members of the OG who were 
only connected to the deviants by an arbitrary group membership. However, despite the effect 
of goal-type on the quantity of negative moral emotions towards the OG, no effect of goal-
type on the quality of these negative moral emotions could be found in Studies 2 - 4. 
Participants in the minimal goal condition were not systematically more likely to report higher 
levels of contempt and disgust than participant in the maximal goal condition. This finding 
might be attributed to the fact that the measurement of negative moral emotions in the present 
research was not targeted at the detection of qualitative but quantitative differences between 
conditions (e.g. participants were not asked to identify the most fitting emotional reaction; the 
qualitative differences between contempt, anger and disgust were in addition not made salient, 
compare Rozin et al., 1999). Future research should therefore not only measure the social 
relational goals that are activated by the deviation by an OG from a minimal respectively 
maximal superordinate goal, but also focus on the quality of the emotions that are triggered by 
this deviation. 
Finally it has to be pointed out that CAD Triad Hypothesis and the social functional 
approach to moral emotions are far from incompatible as both approaches apply to different 
levels of analysis. The CAD Triad Hypothesis is concerned with the situational appraisal of 
specific emotions. The social functional approach is in contrast based on relational goals - 
both on an interpersonal as well as intergroup level - and especially the activation of 
responding behavioral reactions. But negative moral emotions are by no means exclusive. It is 
actually highly likely that individuals experience more than one negative moral emotion in 
response to a perceived transgression. A symbiosis of both approaches for the case of minimal 
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and maximal group goals could imply for example that the moral domain of a transgression 
sets a “background” emotion - contempt, anger, disgust - as a default for any reaction to a 
perceived deviation from a superordinate goal. The goal-type of this superordinate goal may 
determine in turn the social relational goal for the reaction toward an OG deviating from this 
superordinate goal: Short-term aggression and anger in case of a maximal goal representation 
with the option of long-term reconciliation in the case of a successful “conversion” of the 
deviants towards a closer adherence to the superordinate goal; and social distancing, 
contempt, disgust and social exclusion of the deviants in case of a minimal goal representation 
of the superordinate goal. 
These assumptions are however highly speculative. Yet, negative moral emotions play a 
crucial role in the relation between goal-type of a superordinate goal and the infliction of 
harm on deviants from this goal as the present research has shown. A further analysis should 
focus therefore on the activation of specific negative moral emotions and their related social 
functions and consequentially on their capacity to activate qualitatively different forms of 
harm inflicted on deviants. 
5.4 The Impact of Goal-type on the Influence of Attenuating Factors 
The importance of negative moral emotions in the relation between the goal-type of a 
superordinate goal and the extent of harm that is inflicted on members of a deviant OG has 
been shown. The different structures of minimal and maximal goals lead to different 
evaluations of the OGs deviation and elicit different levels of negative moral emotions toward 
the deviants. The extent of negative emotions strongly influences the extent of harm that is 
inflicted on members of the deviant OG. 
However, it may be suggested that this is not the only implication of the representation of 
a superordinate goal as either minimal or maximal for the infliction of harm on a group of 
deviants. It has been argued that the extent of harm that is inflicted in response to an offense is 
not only a function of the perceived magnitude of harm caused by this offense but also the 
perception of mitigating or exacerbating circumstances (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 
2002). But the goal-type of a superordinate goal has also the capability to systematically 
affect this perception of attenuating respectively extenuating circumstances. One important 
factor that is moderating the infliction of harm in response to an offense is the attribution of 
the transgression as a result of either internal or external causes (Weiner, 1986). It is argued 
accordingly that the representation of a superordinate goal as a maximal goal allows an 
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external attribution of an OG´s deviation from this superordinate goal while a minimal goal-
representation facilitates an internal attribution pattern. The graded structure of a maximal 
goal permits an external attribution of an OG´s deviation (example: “Did the OG deviate from 
the average contribution goal of 80 % because they did not understand the game? They didn´t 
contribute at goal level, but they contributed at least some of their initial endowment...”). The 
relative evaluation that coincides with a maximal goal attribution allows giving the members 
of the deviating OG the “benefit of the doubt”, thus attenuating the extent of harm that is 
inflicted on them. The dichotomous structure of a minimal goal on the other hand abets the 
internal attribution of a deviation from a superordinate goal (example: “The OG deviated from 
the average contribution goal of 80 % because they wanted to free-ride and profit from our 
high contributions. The goal was so simple you could only miss it if you wanted to!”). An 
internal attribution of a deviation is promoted by the simplicity of a minimal goal as it can 
only be fully achieved or not at all. Individuals or groups who deviate from a superordinate 
goal that is represented as a minimal goal cannot hope for an evaluation of their deviance 
based on a “benefit-of-the-doubt principle, simply because there is no doubt. This internal 
attribution in the case of a minimal goal representation not only inhibits an attenuation of the 
perceived magnitude of harm caused by an OG´s deviation. It rather extenuates the perceived 
magnitude of harm as the OG is seen as the sole reason for the damage done. 
This suspected effect of goal-type on the attribution of deviance is hypothetical. It appears 
however highly plausible as it complements the effect of goal-type on the perceived 
magnitude of harm caused by the OGs deviance and the resulting differences in negative 
moral emotions toward the OG and the extent of harm that is inflicted on members of the OG. 
5.5 Perspectives on the Infliction of Harm on Deviants 
It has been argued that there are two fundamental perspectives on the infliction of harm on 
deviants. A first perspective has been focusing on the perspective of the targets of harmful 
behavior such as victims of discrimination or even open intergroup aggression as in the case 
of ethnic cleansings. From this perspective any factor that has the potential to increase the 
extent of harm inflicted on deviants - such as a minimal goal representation of a superordinate 
goal - has to be condemned. The question how the formation of a minimal goal representation 
of a superordinate goal could be averted appears self evident from a victim´s point of view. A 
second point of view however has taken a more inclusive and functional perspective on the 
infliction of harm on deviants. This approach takes the perspective of an inclusive group that 
is faced with the deviance of some of its members. This point of view is based on the 
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assumption that any group goal may be described on an abstract level as a Public Goods 
Game. The punishment of deviants enables the sustainment of a high contribution rate 
towards the Public Good of the group goal. This inclusive perspective suggests a completely 
different appraisal of the central finding that the deviation from a minimal superordinate goal 
leads to a higher level of harm inflicted on deviants than the deviation from a maximal 
superordinate goal. This higher level of harm inflicted on deviants should incentivize a 
persistently higher level of contributions to the Public Good of the group goal. The 
representation of a superordinate goal as a minimal goal should lead in other words to a more 
effective pursuit of any designated group goal. 
The peril of an unconsidered application of this highly abstract interpretation to real 
circumstances lies at hand. The capability of a minimal superordinate goal to motivate group 
members to strive more ambitiously towards a common group goal might easily be 
misinterpreted or misused as a justification for any infliction of harm on deviants. Therefore 
any application of the functional implications of the goal-type of a superordinate goal has to 
be accompanied by a normative evaluation of the respective superordinate goal and the 
measures of harm involved. A minimal superordinate goal such as the ethnic and religious 
homogeneity of a population in a given region that has often been at the root of ethnic 
cleansings is for example strictly unacceptable from the widely acknowledged normative 
standpoint of human rights. The forms of harm inflicted on deviants in many of these cases 
such as murder and mutilation are equally unacceptable. However, the minimal goal that 
prisoners of war must not be tortured and humiliated is a minimal goal acknowledged in most 
western countries. This superordinate goal that no torture must be used against prisoners of 
war is a minimal goal as no deviation from it can be tolerated. Groups of individuals deviating 
from this goal - as it has been the case for example in Abu Ghuraib where Iraqi prisoners of 
war were tortured and abused - should be confronted with severe but measured consequences 
such as imprisonment and dishonorable discharge in order to ensure the upkeep of this 
important goal. It has been rightly argued that the punishment of deviants allows the upkeep 
of any group goal whatsoever (Boyd & Richerson, 1992). It has nevertheless to be kept in 
mind that not all group goals are equal from a normative standpoint. All group goals must be 
subjected to a normative ultima ratio such as the human rights as a minimal, utmost 
superordinate goal. 
Recent research on cooperation in social dilemmas adds in addition a promising 
perspective to this inclusive, functional perspective on the infliction of harm on deviant. It has 
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been shown that not only punishment, but also the assignment of reward has the capability to 
elicit and maintain high levels of cooperation in Public Goods Games. It has been shown that 
a reward-option can be as successful as a punishment-option in order to achieve and sustain a 
high level of cooperation in a repeated Public Goods Game with individual identities 
persisting across rounds (Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, Nowak, 2009; see also: Sefton, 
Shupp, Walker, 2006). Similarly, Hauert and co-authors could show that it is the freedom to 
abstain from a group endeavor that enables the emergence of cooperation based on the 
punishment of defectors (Hauert, Traulsen, Brandt, Nowak, Sigmund, 2007). These results 
illustrate that the punishment of defectors is just one strategy to elicit and maintain 
cooperation in groups among others. Future research should consider therefore not only the 
effect of the goal-type of a superordinate goal on the infliction of harm on deviants. But also 
to inquire a potential effect of goal-type on the assignment of rewards to group members and 
the effect of rewards on the individual tendency to contribute to a group endeavor. The 
present research has shown that the deviation from a minimal superordinate goal leads to 
higher levels of harm inflicted on deviants from this goal than the deviation from a maximal 
goal. It has also been suggested that minimal and maximal goals serve different social 
functions. Minimal goals may define the borders of a group, making a dichotomous 
representation of a superordinate goal and the severe punishment of any deviants from this 
goal appropriate in order to protect the group´s cohesion and functionality. Maximal goals 
may define the prototype of a group, an ideal that group members should strive for. It seems 
plausible that not the infliction of harm on any deviants is the best suited measure to 
incentivize the group members´ striving towards such a maximal superordinate goal, but the 
assignment of rewards. 
This doctoral thesis contributes in sum to the understanding of why and to what extent 
members of a deviant group are punished. Five studies were conducted to test the hypothesis 
that the deviation from a minimal superordinate goal leads to a higher level of harm inflicted 
on the members of a deviant group than the deviation from a maximal superordinate goal. 
This relation was expected to be mediated by negative moral emotions toward the deviant 
group. An experimental paradigm was specifically designed to test these hypotheses, 
combining a strictly experimental setup with the measurement of actual forms of harm 
inflicted on members of a deviant group. The evidence yielded from these studies supports 
both hypotheses with great consistency across all five studies and for several forms of harm. 
Various alternative explanations for this effect of the goal-type of a superordinate goal on the 
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infliction of harm on members of a deviant group could be ruled out by incremental changes 
in the experimental design across the course of the different studies.  
The presented research provides therefore strong support for the importance of the goal-
type of a superordinate goal for the infliction of harm on deviants, thus contributing to the 
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 1. Ich bin ungern mit Menschen zusammen, die ich noch nicht kenne. 
2. Meine Bekannten halten mich für einen energischen Menschen. 
3. Ich habe manchmal das Gefühl der Teilnahmslosigkeit und inneren Leere. 
4. Es macht mir Spaß mit anderen zu wetteifern. 
5. Ich bin auch an Wochenenden stark eingespannt. 
6. Ich bin im Grunde ein eher ängstlicher Mensch. 
7. Ich bin ziemlich lebhaft. 
8. Ich schließe nur langsam Freundschaften. 
9. Oft rege ich mich zu rasch über jemanden auf. 





This dissertation is concerned with determinants of explicit negative behavior towards 
members of groups that deviate from the goal of a superordinate group (SOG). It could be 
shown across five studies that the deviation from a minimal superordinate goal leads to a 
higher level of harm inflicted on members of a deviant OG than the deviation from a maximal 
superordinate goal (goal-type hypothesis). This effect of goal-type could even be found for the 
generalized social exclusion of uninvolved OG-members. It could be shown that the relation 
between goal-type (minimal/ maximal) of the superordinate goal and the level of harm 
inflicted on the deviants is mediated by negative moral emotions toward the OG (negative 
emotions hypothesis). 
The presented research comprises two central aims. The first aim was a test of the 
assumption that the representation of a superordinate group goal as either minimal or maximal 
had a significant impact on the extent of harm that would be inflicted on members of a group 
deviating from this goal. Maximal goals are desired or undesired end states that can be 
approached or avoided. Events, which are evaluated relative to maximal goals are judged by 
their relative distance from these goals and therefore receive a graded evaluation. The valence 
of an event relative to a maximal goal depends on its distance to the goal. In contrast to this 
“shades of grey” type of evaluation, minimal goals lead to “black/ white” evaluations of an 
event. Minimal goals define a certain point that must be exceeded. A minimal goal can 
therefore only be fully met or not met at all. An event, which is evaluated relative to a 
minimal goal receives a dichotomous evaluation and is therefore either entirely positive or 
negative. It was assumed that the representation of a superordinate goal as either minimal or 
maximal not only affects the evaluation of an event relative to this goal, but also has strong 
implications on the behavioral reactions towards members of an OG that deviating from this 
superordinate goal. The second central aim of this dissertation was the design an experimental 
paradigm to test these hypotheses. This experimental paradigm addresses a number of 
methodological desiderata: First it allowed the introduction of the superordinate goal of 
making money by collectively contributing in a Public Goods Game. This superordinate goal 
was experimentally manipulated to resemble either a minimal or a maximal goal. Secondly an 
intergroup context was introduced on the basis of the Minimal Group Paradigm in order to 
allow the deviation of a subgroup from the superordinate goal. This categorization had no 
functional implications in terms of the Public Goods Game. The experimental paradigm 
allowed the measurement of actual harm inflicted on the deviant subgroup in response to the 
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deviation of this subgroup from the superordinate goal in the form of monetary punishment, 
social exclusion and generalized social exclusion. The entire experimental paradigm was a 
strictly experimental setup in order to exclude the influence of uncontrolled factors. 
Five Studies were conducted in order to test both the goal-type hypothesis as well as the 
negative emotions hypothesis. The superordinate goal of making money by contributing 
collectively to a Public Goods Game was identical across all studies. In the first three studies 
the goal-type manipulation was based on slightly different designs of a Public Good Game. A 
Graded Public Goods Game was used to resemble the graded structure of a maximal 
superordinate goal. The superordinate goal consisted in this maximal goal condition in an 
ideal average contribution rate of 100 % the initial endowment resulting in a maximum payoff 
on a collective level. A step-level Public Goods Game was used to resemble the dichotomous 
“black/white” structure of a minimal goal. A threshold of an average contribution level had to 
be reached in order to receive a payoff from the Public Good.  
An initial study provided support for the goal-type hypothesis: Participants in the minimal 
goal condition were more likely to punish members of the deviant OG monetarily. However, 
this relation between goal-type and monetary punishment was mediated by participants´ 
identification with their IG and not by negative moral emotions toward the OG. This 
mediation by identification was not hypothesized for. A second study was conducted to 
replicate the effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on members of a deviant OG. This 
second study used a graded contribution option for the Public Goods Game. The effect of 
goal-type on the monetary punishment of members of a deviant OG that was found in the first 
study could be replicated. Participants in the minimal goal condition were more inclined to 
punish members of a deviant OG than participants in the maximal goal condition. This effect 
was as hypothesized mediated by negative emotions towards the OG, no by the participants´ 
identification with their IG. A third study added the dependent measures of social exclusion 
from future rounds and the generalized social exclusion of uninvolved OG-members from 
future profitable studies. In addition the goal-type manipulation was improved. Participants 
received in Study 2 - as a consequence of the OG´s deviation - a slightly lower payoff from 
the step-level Public Goods Game (minimal goal condition) than from the graded Public 
Goods Game (maximal goal condition). This difference in payoffs did not affect the main 
effect of goal-type on monetary punishment. Study 3 controlled experimentally for this 
difference in payoffs. The effect of goal-type on the infliction of harm on members of the 
deviant OG was found for all three measures of harm (monetary punishment, social exclusion 
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from future rounds and generalized social exclusion of uninvolved OG-members). This effect 
was mediated by negative moral emotions toward the OG for all three measures of harm. 
However, the structural differences between step-level Public Goods Game and graded Public 
Goods Game remained. In the maximal goal condition players received at least some payoff 
from the Public Good. In the minimal goal condition participants received no payment at all 
from the Public Good because of the deviation of the OG. This could have lead theoretically 
to a perception of the OG´s deviation as more severe, even though there were no differences 
in final payoffs in Study 3. Therefore a second manipulation of goal-type was introduced in 
Study 4, based on a mere framing of goal-type. All players engaged in a graded Public Goods 
Game. The superordinate goal was either framed as a graded “shades-of-grey”-goal or a 
minimal “black-or-white”-goal. The same effect tog goal-type as in the previous studies was 
found. Participants in the minimal goal condition were more likely to punish members of the 
deviant OG monetarily and exclude them from future rounds. This effect was again mediated 
by negative moral emotions towards the OG. A fifth study using the same manipulation of 
goal-type based on a mere framing as in Study 4 found could replicate the effect of goal-type 
on the generalized social exclusion of uninvolved OG-members from future profitable studies. 
A summarizing analysis could show the high stability of described effects across the various 
studies. 
This doctoral thesis contributes in sum to an improved the understanding why members of 
deviant groups are sometimes punished mildly and sometimes confronted with the infliction 
of severe harm for the very same deviation. An ambitious experimental paradigm was 
designed that allows research on determinants of the infliction of harm on members of OG´s 
using actual behavioral measures of different forms of harm in an experimentally controlled 
context. Both initial hypotheses - goal-type hypothesis as well as negative emotions 
hypothesis - could be confirmed across multiple studies: Individuals with a minimal goal 
representation of a superordinate goal are more likely to inflict more harm on members of an 
OG deviating from this goal than individuals with a maximal goal representation. The 
presented research constitutes the introduction of the goal-type of a superordinate goal as an 





Das zentrale Anliegen dieser Dissertation ist die Bestimmung von Determinanten explizit 
negativen Verhaltens gegenüber Mitgliedern von Fremdgruppen, die von einem Ziel einer 
übergeordneten Gruppe abweichen. Über 5 Studien hinweg konnte gezeigt werden, dass die 
Abweichung von einem als Minimalziel repräsentierten übergeordneten Ziel gegenüber den 
Mitgliedern einer abweichenden Gruppe zu einem höheren Grad an Bestrafung führt als die 
Abweichung von einem als Maximalziel repräsentierten übergeordneten Ziel (Zieltyp-
Hypothese). Dieser Effekt des Zieltyps eines übergeordneten Ziels auf die Bestrafung von 
Mitgliedern einer devianten Gruppe konnte für verschiedene Formen von explizit negativem 
Verhalten wie monetäre Bestrafung, sozialen Ausschluß von zukünftigen Runden eines Public 
Good Games und sogar den generalisierten sozialen Ausschluß unbeteiligter 
Gruppenmitglieder gezeigt werden. Der Effekt des Zieltyps des übergeordneten Ziels 
(Minimalziel versus Maximalziel) auf die Bestrafung von Mitgliedern einer devianten 
Fremdgruppe wurde durch negative moralische Emotionen gegenüber der Fremdgruppe 
mediiert (Negative Emotionen Hypothese). 
Die vorgestellte Forschungsarbeit umfasste zwei zentrale Zielsetzungen: Die erste 
Zielsetzung war der Test der Vermutung, dass die Repräsentation eines Ziels einer 
übergeordneten Gruppe als Minimal- oder Maximalziel einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf das 
Ausmaß der Bestrafung von Mitgliedern einer Gruppe hat, die von diesem übergeordneten 
Ziel abweichen. Ereignisse, die in Relation zu einem Maximalziel beurteilt werden, werden 
auf der Basis ihrer relativen Entfernung von diesem Ziel evaluiert. Je näher ein Ereignis 
einem Maximalziel kommt, desto positiver ist seine Bewertung. Im Gegensatz zu dieser 
Evaluation auf der Basis von “Grauschattierungen” erfolgt die Evaluation von Ereignissen in 
Relation zu Minimalzielen anhand eines dichotomen “schwarz/weiß”-Denkens. Minimalziele 
definieren eine bestimmte Schwelle, die nicht überschritten werden darf. Ein Minimalziel 
kann deshalb nur vollständig erfüllt werden oder überhaupt nicht. Ein Ereignis, das relativ zu 
einem Minimalziel evaluiert wird erfährt eine dichotome Bewertung und ist entweder 
vollständig positiv oder komplett negativ. Es wurde angenommen, daß die Repräsentation 
eines übergeordneten Ziels als Minimalziel oder Maximalziel nicht nur die Evaluation eines 
Ereignisses in Relation zu diesem Ziel beeinflußt, sondern auch weitreichende Implikationen 
für die Verhaltensreaktionen gegenüber den Mitgliedern einer Gruppe hat, die von diesem 
übergeordneten Ziel abweicht. 
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Die zweite zentrale Zielsetzung dieser Dissretation war die Gestaltung eines experimentellen 
Paradigmas, um sowohl Zieltyp-Hypothese als auch Negative-Emotionen-Hypothese zu testen. 
Dieses experimentelle Paradigma berücksichtigt eine Reihe von Desiderata: Es erlaubt die 
Einführung eines gemeinsamen übergeordneten Ziels in Form von Geld verdienen durch 
kollektives Beitragen in einem Public Goods Game. Dieses übergeordnete Ziel wurde 
experimentell manipuliert um entweder ein Minimalziel oder ein Maximalziel darzustellen 
(Zieltypmanipulation). Zudem wurde ein Intergruppenkontext auf der Basis des Minimalen 
Gruppenparadigmas eingeführt, um die Abweichung von Mitgliedern einer devianten Gruppe 
vorzubereiten. Diese willkürliche Kategorisierung in zwei Gruppen hatte keine funktionale 
Bedeutung für das Public Goods Game. Das experimentelle Paradigma erlaubte zudem den 
Schaden zu messen, welcher der vom gemeinsamen Ziel abweichenden Gruppe zugefügt 
wurde. Hierzu wurden unterschiedliche Maße wie monetäre Bestrafung, sozialer Ausschluß 
und generalisierter sozialer Ausschluß verwendet. Das gesamte Paradigma folgte einem 
strikten experimentellen Aufbau um den Einfluss unkontrollierter Faktoren auszuschließen. 
Es wurden fünf Studien durchgeführt um sowohl Zieltyp-Hypothese als auch die Negative 
Emotionen-Hypothese zu testen. Das übergeordnete Ziel war in allen fünf Studien das 
Verdienen von Geld durch kollektives Beitragen in einem Public Goods Game. In den ersten 
drei Studien wurde der Zieltyp dieses übergeordneten Ziels (Minimalziel versus Maximalziel) 
durch Varianten eines Public Goods Games manipuliert. Ein kontinuierliches Public Goods 
Game wurde genutzt, um die stufenlose Struktur eines Maximalziels widerzuspiegeln. Das 
Maximalziel bestand in dieser Maximalzielbedingung in einer idealen durchschnittlichen 
Beitragsrate von 100 % der Anfangsauszahlungen, was aus kollektiver Sicht eine maximale 
Auszahlung aus dem Public Good zur Folge gehabt hätte. Ein gestuftes Public Goods Game 
wurde hingegen genutzt um die dichotome „schwarz/weiß“-Struktur eines Minimalziels 
widerzugeben. Hierbei musste eine bestimmte durchschnittliche Beitragsschwelle erreicht 
werden, damit alle Spieler eine Auszahlung aus dem Public Good erhielten. 
Die Ergebnisse einer ersten Studie waren in Einklang mit der Zieltyp-Hypothese: 
Probanden in der Minimalzielbedingung bestraften Mitglieder einer devianten Gruppe stärker 
monetär als Probanden in der Maximalzielbedingung. Diese Beziehung zwischen dem Zieltyp 
des übergeordneten Ziels und monetärer Bestrafung wurde jedoch durch die Identifikation der 
Teilnehmer mit ihrer Eigengruppe mediiert, und nicht durch negative moralische Emotionen 
gegenüber der devianten Gruppe. Diese Mediation war somit unerwartet und widersprach der 
Negative Emotionen Hypothese. Eine zweite Studie wurde durchgeführt um den Effekt des 
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Zieltyps des übergeordneten Ziels auf das Ausmaß der monetären Bestrafung von Mitgliedern 
der devianten Fremdgruppe zu replizieren. In dieser zweiten Studie wurde im Rahmen des 
Public Goods Games eine stufenlose Beitragsoption verwendet. Der Effekt des Zieltyps des 
übergeordneten Ziels auf die monetäre Bestrafung der Mitglieder der devianten Gruppe 
konnte repliziert werden. Studienteilnehmer in der Minimalzielbedingung bestraften die 
Mitglieder der devianten Gruppe signifikant stärker als Probanden in der 
Maximalzielbedingung. Dieser Effekt wurde gemäß der Negative-Emotionen Hypothese durch 
negative moralische Emotionen mediiert, und nicht durch die Identifikation der Probanden 
mit ihrer Eigengruppe. In einer dritten Studie wurden zwei weitere abhängige Maße explizit 
negativen Verhaltens eingeführt: Der soziale Ausschluß von zukünftigen Runden des Public 
Goods Games und der generalisierte soziale Ausschluß von unbeteiligten Mitgliedern der 
devianten Gruppe. Zusätzlich wurde die Zieltypmanipulation weiter verbessert. Die 
Teilnehmer der zweiten Studie erhielten aufgrund der Abweichung der devianten Gruppe eine 
geringfügig geringere Auszahlung aus dem gestuften Public Goods Game 
(Minimalzielbedingung) als aus dem kontinuierlichen Public Goods Game 
(Maximalzielbedingung). Dieser geringe Unterschied in den Auszahlungen konnte jedoch 
nicht den Effekt des Zieltyps des übergeordneten Ziels auf das Ausmaß der monetären 
Bestrafung erklären. Dennoch wurden in der dritten Studie jegliche aus der Abweichung der 
devianten Gruppe resultierenden Auszahlungsunterschiede experimentell ausgeschlossen. Ein 
Effekt des Zieltyps des übergeordneten Ziels gemäß der Zieltyp-Hypothese wurde für alle drei 
abhängigen Maße gefunden (monetäre Bestrafung, sozialen Ausschluß von zukünftigen 
Runden und generalisierten sozialen Ausschluß unbeteiligter Mitglieder der devianten 
Gruppe). Dieser Effekt wurde bei allen drei abhängigen Maßen durch negative moralische 
Emotionen mediiert. Ein struktureller Unterschied zwischen gestuftem und kontinuierlichem 
Public Goods Game blieb auch bei der in Studie 3 verwendeten Manipulation des Zieltyps des 
übergeordneten Ziels übrig. Probanden in der Maximalzielbedingung erhielten trotz der 
Abweichung der devianten Gruppe eine geringe Auszahlung aus dem Public Good, 
wohingegen Probanden in der Minimalzielbedingung keinerlei Auszahlung aus dem Public 
Good erhielten. Obwohl es in der dritten Studie keinerlei Auszahlungsunterschiede zwischen 
Minimal- und Maximalzielbedingung gab, könnte dieser strukturelle Unterschied zu einer 
Wahrnehmung der Abweichung der devianten Gruppe als schwerwiegender in der Minimal- 
als in der Maximalzielbedingung geführt haben. Daher wurde in Studie 4 eine zweite Art der 
Zieltypmanipulation eingeführt. Diese basierte auf einem einfachen Framing des Zieltyps des 
übergeordneten Ziels als Minimal oder-Maximalziel. Alle Studienteilnehmer spielten ein 
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kontinuierliches Public Goods Game unabhängig von der Zeltypbedingung. Das 
übergeordnete Ziel wurde entweder als kontinuierliches Ziel mit verschiedenen Graden der 
Zielerreichung oder als dichotomes Ziel formuliert, das entweder nur voll und ganz oder gar 
nicht erreicht werden konnte. Erneut konnte derselbe Effekt des Faktors Zieltyp des 
übergeordneten Ziels auf die Bestrafung der devianten Gruppe wie in den vorherherigen 
Studien gefunden werden. Probanden in der Minimalzielbedingung waren starker geneigt die 
Mitglieder der devianten Gruppe monetär zu bestrafen und sozial auszuschließen. Dieser 
Effekt wurde erneut durch negative moralische Emotionen mediiert. Eine fünfte Studie 
benutzte dieselbe Zieltypmanipulation wie in Studie 4, basierend auf einem einfachen 
Framing des Zieltyps des übergeordneten Ziels. In dieser Studie konnte der Effekt des 
Zieltyps des übergeordneten Ziels auf den generalisierten sozialen Ausschluß unbeteiligter 
Mitglieder der devianten Gruppe repliziert werden. Eine zusammenfassende Analyse zeigt die 
hohe Stabilität des Zieltyps des übergeordneten Ziels auf die Bestrafung von Mitgliedern 
einer abweichenden Gruppe (Zieltyphypothese). 
Zusammengefasst trägt diese Dissertation zu einem verbesserten Verständnis der Prozesse 
bei, warum Mitglieder abweichender Gruppen für dieselbe Abweichung mitunter nur milde 
bestraft werden und sich manchmal als Reakation mit schwerwiegenden Strafen und Gewalt 
konfrontiert sehen. Ein ambitioniertes experimentelles Paradigma wurde entwickelt, das die 
Untersuchung von Determinanten von explizit negativem Verhalten gegenüber Mitgliedern 
einer devianten Gruppe ermöglicht. Als besonderes Merkmal können im Rahmen dieses 
Paradigmas verschiedene Formen explizit negativen Verhaltens gemessen und zugleich eine 
experimentelle Kontrolle gewährleistet werden. In diesem experimentellen Paradigma wurden 
zwei Hypothesen über fünf Studien hinweg getestet und bestätigt: Die Zieltyp-Hypothese und 
die Negative Emotionen Hypothese. Die Ergebnisse belegen, dass Individuen mit einer 
Minimalzielrepräsentation eines übergeordneten Ziels Mitglieder einer devianten Gruppe 
signifikant härter bestrafen und eher ausschließen als Individuen mit einer 
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